Case Notes by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 9
1968
Case Notes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Case Notes, 59 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 95 (1968)
CASE NOTES
Section 1.
Any person, not a physician, who provides to any
woman, or procures any woman to take, any drug,
medicine, or substance, or uses any instrument or
other means whatever upon any woman, with
intent thereby to induce an abortion of such
woman, shall be imprisoned in the state prison for
a period of -, but if the woman should die
as a result of such attempted abortion, then such
person or persons attempting to induce the abor-
tion shall be punished as provided by law for the
crime of murder in the first degree. For purposes
of this section it shall not be necessary to prove that
the woman was in fact pregnant, nor that an
abortion resulted
Section 2.
Any physician who provides to any woman, or
procures any woman to take, any drug, medicine,
or substance, or uses any instrument or other
means whatever upon any woman, with intent
thereby to induce an abortion of such woman
without the express authorization of the thera-
peutic abortion committee of the hospital at which
the abortion is to be performed, or any physician
who provides to any woman, or procures any
woman to take, any drug, medicine, or substance,
or uses any instrument or other means whatever
upon any woman, with intent thereby to induce
an abortion of such woman in any place other
than a hospital shall be imprisoned in the state
prison for a period of , but if the woman
should die as a result of such attempted abortion,
then the physician shall be imprisoned in the
stateprison fora period of - . Anyphysician
found guilty of violating this section shall, in
addition to imprisonment, have his or her license
to practice medicine in this state revoked forever.
For purposes of this section it shall not be necessray
to prove that the woman was in fact pregnant, nor
that an abortion resulted.
Section 3.
A physician is justified in terminating a woman's
pregnancy if the therapeutic abortion committee
of the hospital at which the abortion is to be
performed has determined that the continuation
of the pregnancy will gravely impair the mental or
physical health of the woman.
Section 4.
A physician is justified in terminating a woman's
pregnancy if the therapeutic abortion committee
of the hospital at which the abortion is to be
performed has determined that the pregnancy was
a result of rape, incest, or other felonious inter-
course.
Section 5.
Every hospital performing therapeutic abortions
shall have a therapeutic abortion committee
which will meet weekly. The purpose of such com-
mittee is to determine which applicants for thera-
peutic abortions, if any, warrant such abortions.
The committee is to be comprised of at least one
obstetrician, one gynecologist, one psychiatrist,
one sociologist, and one lawyer. Said committee is
required to be registered with the State Public
Health Department.
Section 6.
Only residents of this state may be considered as
candidates for therapeutic abortion by the hospi-
tal committees.
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Telephone Coin Box Not Within Burglary
Statute--Macas v. People, 421 P.2d 116 (Colo.
1966). After a conviction for burglary and con-
spiracy to commit burglary of a coin box in a pay
telephone booth, defendant moved for a new trial.
His motion was denied by the district court and
he appealed.
Although not raised in defendant's prior motion
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nor in his brief on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Colorado felt justice required that it address itself
to the sole question of whether a telephone booth
may be the subject of burglary. In holding that it
could not, even though a building within the
meaning of the burglary statute, Sanchez v. People,
349 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1960), the court reversed the
judgment and remanded with directions to vacate
the sentence and discharge the defendant.
At common law, burglary included, as an ele-
ment, actual or constructive trespass on another's
property with intent to commit some other crime
thereupon. By statute in Colorado, however, as in
other states, the common law form of burglary
has been modified. Colorado's burglary statute,
provides that:
[1] Every person who shall willfully and forc-
ibly break and enter or [2] willfully, without
force, enter any building,... with intent to
commit..., larceny, or other felony or mis-
demeanor, or [3] who being lawfully within
any building or trailer, shall with like intent,
either with or without force, enter into any
room, apartment, or compartment of the
same building,... shall be deemed guilty of
burglary,....
In reaching its decision, the court interpreted
situations [1] and [21 of the statute as involving a
direct trespass to another's property. It reasoned
that since it was virtually impossible to have an
unlawful entry into a telephone booth which is
continuously open to the public, the first two
situations of the statute did not apply. As to
situation [3], involving a lawful entry, the court
held it inapplicable because a telephone booth
contains no "room, apartment or compartment
of the same building".
There were two dissenting justices who urged
that situation [2] of the statute applied because
defendant upon entering the booth for an unlawful
purpose was not a business invitee, nor licensee
but was, under the circumstances, a trespasser.
Refusal To Give Access To Law Library Ne-
gated Conditional Waiver Of Counsel-People v.
Carter, 427 P.2d 214 (Cal. 1967). Defendant was
convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery
and robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.
The California Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ments.
The issue on appeal was whether defendant had
effectively waived his constitutional right to
counsel. At the trial, defendant had been granted
numerous continuances and changes of counsel.
Finally, defendant and his attorney moved to
have the former substituted in propia persona.
The trial court then conducted an inquiry to
ascertain defendant's ability to defend himself.
The defendant stated that he was only a high
school graduate but that he would consider him-
self capable of self-representation before the court
if he were granted the use of the law library. After
being satisfied of defendant's capability, the court
granted the motion and proceeded with the trial.
Several times during the proceedings the defendant
requested time to go to the law library, but these
requests were denied. The court only offered to
get materials for defendant or to take him through
the law library during a recess. The defendant
contended that such limited use would make it
impossible to defend himself and he refused to
participate further. He was subsequently con-
victed.
The California Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that the defendant's constitutional right
to counsel had not been adequately protected.
The trial court's inquiry was insufficient to prop-
erly judge the defendant's capabilities. The higher
court concluded that the defendant was unaware
of the true consequences of his purported waiver
of the right to counsel. Had he been permitted
the use of the law library, as was the condition of
his waiver, his action might have been regarded
as more competent. But a waiver of counsel which
is made conditional by a defendant cannot be
effective unless the condition is accepted by the
court. Here the trial court misled the defendant.
Since the condition was not going to be fully
accepted, the trial court should have promptly
and unequivocally rejected it.
Scienter Necessary To Convict For Possession
Of Narcotics-Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla.
App. 1967). Defendant was convicted of unlawfully
possessing narcotic drugs. He appealed on the
ground, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a jury instruction on the
issue of scienter.
The evidence showed that the defendant shared
an apartment with another man, although he was
alone in the apartment when he was arrested and
the premises were searched. The defendant's
roommate had equal control over the apartment
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and equal access to the places where the narcotics
were found-between the mattresses of a bed, in a
vase, and in a drawer of a night table. The de-
fendant denied any knowledge that the narcotics
were in the apartment.
At the conclusion of the trial the court denied
defendant's request for an instruction on the issue
of scienter and stated that "it would be very
difficult for the State to prove that this man had
knowledge of (the narcotics)". The court instead
gave its "regular charge" to the jury based on
possession which he defined as "having personal
charge of or exercising the right of ownership,
management, or control of the property in ques-
tion".
The appellate court noted that the applicable
statute was silent as to any requirement of knowl-
edge, but concluded that this requirement was
implicit in the language of the statute. The court
held, therefore, that the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the
presence of narcotics on his premises. The court
stated:
If the premises on which the drugs are found
are in the exclusive possession and control of
the accused, knowledge of their presence on
such premises coupled with his ability to main-
tain control over them may be inferred. Al-
though no further proof of knowledge by the
State is required in cases of exclusive posses-
sion by the accused, the inference of knowledge
is rebuttable and not conclusive. If the prem-
ises on which the drugs are found is not in the
exclusive but only in the joint possession of the
accused, knowledge of the drugs' presence on
the premises and the ability to maintain con-
trol over them by the accused will not be in-
ferred but must be established by proof. Such
proof may consist either of evidence establish-
ing actual knowledge by the accused, or evi-
dence of incriminating statements and circum-
stances from which a jury might lawfully infer
knowledge by the accused of the drugs' pres-
ence on the premises. In any event, the ques-
tion of scienter or knowledge is one which must
be resolved by the jury under the evidence in
the case and upon proper instruction by the
court embodying the principles discussed
above.
The court thus held it was reversible error for
the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the
issue of scienter "merely because ... this element
of the offense would be difficult for the State to
prove".
Specific Intent Necessary For Conspiracy Indict-
ment-People v. Tierney, 61 Cal.Rptr. 164 (Ct.
App., 1967). The defendants were indicated by
the grand jury for conspiracy, petit theft, and
creation of advertising matter represented or held
out to be obscene which was also false and mislead-
ing. The indictments were dismissed by the trial
court. The state appealed.
The evidence presented to the grand jury showed
that an unsolicited brochure called the 'Lupe
Ramirez" was mailed by Consolidated Produc-
tions, Incorporated, and received by certain resi-
dents of a California county. The brochure offered
for sale allegedly obscene films, photographs, play-
ing cards, and illustrated comic books. The bro-
chure was called to the attention of the district
attorney who asked certain recipients to order some
of the material which it was presumed would be
obscene. The material was actually "innocuous"
and did not live up to the brochure's offer.
The respondents, who were the incorporators of
the Consolidated Productions Co., motioned for
the dismissal of the indictments against them. The
trial court dismissed. The test used by the appel-
late court to rule on their motion was, "whether the
members of the grand jury, considering the evi-
dence, and acting as men of ordinary caution and
prudence, could be led to believe and conscien-
tiously entertain a reasonable suspicion that the
defendants were guilty of the offense charged".
The respondents contended that the crime of
conspiracy could not be established because the re-
quirement of specific intent was not shown. The
appellate court ruled that the existence of specific
intent could be shown by circumstantial evidence.
The circumstantial evidence warranted finding that
the advertisement of obscene material was a
scheme to extract money from the public. This
finding was held to support the indictments for
conspiracy to commit theft and to use false and
misleading advertisements.
The respondents also contended that they had
no specific intent to violate any penal code sec-
tions. The appellate court refused to accept this
contention, since the only relevant factor is that
the respondents knew "that what they were doing
was wrong". "They knew their brochure impliedly
promised one thing and that they were delivering
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something less than that promised." The act alone
may not be sufficient to establish specific intent,
but "coupled with knowledge that the act done is
unlawful," specific intent can be shown.
The appellate court therefore reversed the order
dismissing the indictments and remanded for a
new trial.
Comment: This case illustrates that ignorance
of the law is no defense when the defendants know
their conduct is wrong. The defendants did not
have to know exactly what laws they were violating
to be held accountable to society for specifically
intending to break those laws. Specific intent will
be found where the only excuse is a "dishonest
ignorance" of the particular law in question.
This opinion also stresses that circumstantial
evidence can be used to support a finding of specific
intent. Reasonable suspicions can be raised without
a direct confession from which to ascertain intent.
The evidence here showed that the defendants
planned to take money from a part of the public by
false advertisements. This evidence was sufficient
to warrant the indictments for conspiracy.
Mere Silent Acquiescence Insufficient For Con-
viction As An Accessory-Pace v. State, 224 N.E.2d
312 (Ind. 1967). Defendant was convicted of the
crime of being an accessory before the fact of rob-
bery and was sentenced to 10-15 years in the
Indiana Reformatory. As the defendant was
driving with his family and one rider, Rootes, he
stopped to pick up a hitchhiker, Reppert. In the
course of the drive, the hitchhiker was robbed by
the defendant's passenger. All the while the de-
fendant said nothing and continued to drive. The
court held that the verdict was not sustained by
sufficient evidence which showed affirmative con-
duct or a failure to oppose the crime where a duty
to do so existed.
The sole issue concerned the type of evidence
needed to sustain a conviction as an accessory be-
fore the fact. In Mattingly v. State, 104 N.E.2d 721
(Ind. 1952), the court said that negative acquies-
cence was not sufficient to constitute the crime,
rather evidence of affirmative conduct which might
lead to an inference of a common design to commit
the crime was necessary to sustain a conviction.
Additional tests were devised by the court in
b'obley v. State, 85 N.E.2d 489 (Ind. 1949) which
held that the trier of fact may consider failure to
oppose a crime in light of other circumstances such
as the relationship between the victim and the
accessory.
In the instant case the court found neither evi-
dence of affirmative conduct on the part of the
defendant nor in the light of the situation a duty to
oppose the crime. The court reversed the convic-
tion for lack of sufficient evidence which showed
that defendant had aided and abbetted the
robbery.
State Must Rebut Defense Of Entrapment-
People v. Carmichael, 225 N.E.2d 458 (Ill. App.
1967). Defendant was convicted on two counts for
the unlawful possession and the unlawful sale of
narcotics. His contention on appeal was that a
police informer supplied the narcotics which pro-
vided the basis for these charges, and that this con-
stituted entrapment.
Defendant testified in his own behalf that the
police informer came to his apartment nine days
before the alleged purchase, told defendant he had
been in trouble with the police recently for the pos-
session of marijuana, and asked defendant to keep
a package for him not stating what it contained.
When the informer, who was now working with the
police, returned to defendant's apartment to make
the alleged purchase, he picked up part of the con-
tents of the package and gave defendant $15 in
marked money for taking care of it. Although the
informer testified that he made the purchase from
defendant, the state presented no evidence in
rebuttal of defendant's explanation as to how he
came into possession of the narcotics.
The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the con-
viction, holding that defendant's testimony estab-
lished entrapment, and the state did not sustain
its burden of rebutting such evidence. In reaching
its decision, the court relied solely upon the two
recent Illinois cases in which entrapment was
found. People v. Strong, 172 N.E.2d 765 (11. 1961)
and People v. Jones, 219 N.E.2d 12 (I11. App. 1966).
In neither case was the police informer called as a
witness for the state to contradict the defendant's
uncontroverted explanation that he obtained nar-
cotics from the informer. The state's attempt to
distinguish those cases from the case at bar on the
ground that in the instant case the informer was
called as a witness for the prosecution was rejected
by the court. Even though the informer testified,
equally important is the weight to be given that
testimony, and, since defendant's explanation of
how he obtained possession remained uncontro-
verted in its vital aspects, entrapment was shown.
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Instruction On Insanity Held Reversible Error-
Smith v. State, 198 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1967). The de-
fendant was convicted of murder, and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The victim was a married
woman for whom the defendant was attempting to
secure a divorce. One night, the defendant went to
her place of employment, and with no other warn-
ing but, "Mildred, I hate to do this", shot the
woman six times. He immediately drove to the
county courthouse where he was arrested.
At the trial, the defendant's attorney pleaded
insanity. Two separate psychiatric examinations
were made and introduced in support of this plea.
The psychiatric reports were sufficient to make it a
question for the jury whether the state had met
its burden of proving the defendant's sanity.
The defendant appealed on the basis of the
insanity instruction given to the jury which con-
tained a reference to irresistible impulse. The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court found merit in the appel-
lant's argument that there was no evidence in the
case upon which the irresistible impulse instruction
could be based. The court held that the giving of
this instruction was prejudicial to the defendant,
since the jury might decide if there had been such
an impulse, rather than whether the defendant
knew right from wrong.
The court also took close scrutiny of the instruc-
tional language itself, and found the wording too
complicated for the ordinary, intelligent juror. The
Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that such an
involved instruction would reasonably lead the
jurors to find the insanity defense invalid. On these
two grounds, the instruction was held reversible
error.
Comment: This case illustrates how the insanity
instruction inadvertently can confuse rather than
enlighten the jurors. At one point, the instruction
reads:
if the defendant commits a crime under an
uncontrollable impulse resulting from mental
disease, and which, at the time and place of the
alleged crime exists to such a high degree that
for the time it overwhelms his reason, judg-
ment, and conscious, and his power to properly
perceive the difference between the moral right
and wrong of the alleged criminal act....
Such an instruction necessarily required jurors
equipped with psychiatric, sociological, and legal-
istic knowledge. If the goal is to find a panel of men
so endowed, insanity pleas should no longer be
judged by the ordinary juror. A special group
should be gathered to do justice to the assignment.
This court felt the ordinary juror can do the job
if provided with the proper instruction. The way
to instruct jurors, however, becomes more complex
as the science of psychiatry continues to mix with
the concept of criminal responsibility. This problem
has to be faced if the jury is to be maintained as a
suitable decisionmaker in this area.
Statement By Prosecutor Of Personal Belief
Based On Facts Not In Evidence Held Error-
People v. Bandlauer, 426 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1967). The
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. Upon this appeal, the judgment
was reversed insofar as it related to the penalty and
was affirmed in other respects.
The defendant contended the prosecutor was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct because of state-
ments he made to the jury. The Supreme Court of
California found the prosecutor erred in his argu-
ment on the issue of penalty when, after emphasiz-
ing his public responsibility, he told the jury:
During the many years that I have been
a prosecutor, I have seen some pretty de-
praved character (sic). Usually they are kind
of old because it takes a little while to become
this depraved. But it has seldom been my mis-
fortune to see a more deprave (sic) character
than this one.
This statement was found in error because it was
testimonial, because it was unrelated to the evi-
dence in the case, and had not been subject to cross-
examination by the defendant, and because it pre-
sented to the jury an external standard based on
the prosecutor's experience upon which to fix the
penalty. The court held that while counsel may
argue his case vigorously, he cannot state his per-
sonal beliefs based on facts not in evidence.
justices Burke and McComb dissented from the
reversal of the judgment as to the penalty. They ar-
gued the prosecutor's statements should not be in-
terpreted literally, but should be construed merely
as an assertion that the defendant was extremely
depraved, an assertion fully justified by the evi-
dence. They also argued that even if the statements
were in error, the error was not prejudicial because
the statements were only a small portion of the
prosecutor's argument and because the jury was
instructed at the close of the arguments that it
should not consider as evidence any statement
made by counsel unless the statement was made as
an admission or stipulation conceding the existence
of a fact.
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Cross-Examination On Failure To Testify At
Hearing Is Permissible-State v. Hines, 195 So.2d
550 (Fla. 1967). Defendant was convicted on a
charge of aggravated assault. The Florida District
Court of Appeals, First District, 186 So.2d 820
(1966), reversed and remanded for a new trial and
defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The
Florida Supreme Court granted the writ, quashed
the decision of the district court, and remanded the
case for entry of decision in conformity with the
trial court's opinion.
The major issue on appeal concerned the rights
of a defendant who had failed to testify at a pre-
liminary hearing but then elected to take the stand
at the trial. The precise question was whether
reversible error had occurred when the prosecutor
on cross-examination interrogated the defendant
concerning his failure to testify at the hearing. In
answering this question in the affirmative, the
district court relied upon the authority of Sinmwns
v. State, 190 So.756 (Fla., 1939), a rape case, and
Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d 662 (Fia. Ct. App.,
1958), a second-degree murder case. The same
question had been presented on appeal in these two
earlier cases. According to Simimons, as followed
by Hathaway, the statutory prohibition, against
comment by the prosecution on the defendant's
failure to testify applied to the various preliminary
proceedings and to former trials as well as to his
failure to testify in the present trial.
The Florida Supreme Court in Hines expressly
repudiated this rule of the Simmons and Hathaway
cases on the grounds that once the defendant
voluntarily took the stand at the trial the statutory
provision no longer applied. In so doing, the court
cited Odom v. State, 109 So.2d 163 (1959), in which
the Florida Supreme Court had held that when a
defendant voluntarily gave testimony concerning
one phase of the case, it was not error for the prose-
cutor to comment on his failure to testify concern-
ing other phases of it. Based on this precedent, the
Florida Supreme Court in Hines established the
new rule that once a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution voluntarily elects to testify before the jury
his silence at various preliminary proceedings need
not be ignored by the prosecutor or the jury.
Comment: There appears to be a great deal of
confusion in this area of the law. All of the cases
regard the prosecutor's questioning of the defend-
ant as equivalent to a comment to the jury since
their purposes are the same. Most of the cases also
recognize a defendant's constitutional right against
self-incrimination at a pretrial hearing. Where the
courts divide appears to be on the issue of whether
defendant can waive his right by subsequent volun-
tary testimony.
The United States Supreme Court considered
the issue in Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494
(1926), a case involving two trials. The conclusion
was that defendant's voluntary testimony at the
second trial amounted to a waiver. But many state
courts, speaking of constitutional rights, have not
followed this precedent where the facts before them
could be distinguished. State v. Conway, 154 S.W.2d
128 (Mo. 1941). In 1956, the United States Su-
preme Court added to this confusion by sidestep-
ping the Raffel decision on the basis of "special
circumstances" in defendant's failure to testify
before a grand jury. Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391 (1956). Although Grunewald was a
unanimous decision, four members of the Court
joined in a special concurring opinion calling for
the complete overruling of Raffel. justice Black,
who wrote the concurring opinion, said:
I can think of no special circumstances that
would justify use of a constitutional privilege
to discredit or convict a person who asserts it.
The value of constitutional privileges is largely
destroyed if persons can be penalized for rely-
ing on them.
In the light of recent Supreme Court decisions such
as Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), extend-
ing the constitutional requirement against self-
incrimination to the states, and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), holding such require-
ments appliable even at the time of arrest, the
trend would appear to be with Justice Black and
not the Florida Supreme Court.
Comment On Failure To Testify Only "Harm-
less Error"-People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606 (Cal.
1967). Defendant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree and attempted murder and he appealed.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the con-
victions.
The issue on appeal concerned the effect of a
comment by the prosecution on defendant's failure
to testify. At the time of defendant's trial, the
California Constitution permitted such a comment.
But subsequently the Supreme Court of the United
States in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
held that adverse comment violated the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
made applicable to the states through the Four-
[Vol. 59
CASE NOTES
teenth Amendment. Since the rule in Griffin ap-
plied to cases pending on appeal at the time that it
was announced, the only question was whether this
required automatic reversal. Relying on Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966), the California
Supreme Court decided that the facts and circum-
stances of each case must be considered to deter-
mine whether the constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. If it were found harm-
less under this test, then there need be no reversal.
After considering the facts in this case, the several
eye-witness reports, and the evidence found on the
defendant at the time of his arrest, the California
Supreme Court concluded that there was no reason-
able possibility that the prosecutor's comment
could have changed the result of the trial. There-
fore, the error was held to have been harmless and
the convictions were affirmed.
Comment: This case shows the difficulty of the
United States Supreme Court's test of what consti-
tutes a harmless constitutional error. Chapman also
involved a comment by the prosecution on defend-
ant's failure to testify. In that case, both the
California test and the particular facts of the case
were held inadequate to meet the test of being
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, al-
though the proper test was now declared, the ap-
plication of that test remained on a flexible case-by-
case basis. Confronted by a similar fact situation in
Ross, the California court was able to reach the
same result merely by using different terminology.
Even if the California court did in fact attempt to
apply the new test, without the trial court atmos-
phere and unrecorded innuendoes it might be
doubted whether the exact prejudicial effect can be
determined. The law should prohibit, as much as
possible, conflicting consequences arising from the
same factual situation. It is submitted that unless
the United States Supreme Court is prepared to
review every case involving a harmless constitu-
tional error, more definitive tests should be laid
down.
Comment On Defendant's Failure To Testify
Held Responsive To Defense Counsel's Improper
Statements-People v. Hill, 426 P.2d 908 (Cal.
1967). The defendants were convicted of murder
and robbery in the first degree and of assault with
intent to commit murder and were sentenced to
death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed
the convictions and sentences.
At the opening of his rebuttal argument on the
penalty issue the prosecutor stated:
[Counsel for Saunders] tells you that the D. A.
could have gone into certain questions when
Mr. Saunders was on the stand on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession; but, if you re-
call, ladies and gentlemen, he took the stand
for one, one limited purpose: that is, the vol-
untariness of the confession. I couldn't ask
him where he had been and what he had done
and whether he committed this crime....
Saunders contended these comments violated his
privilege against self-incrimination and that the
trial court's refusal to permit his counsel to respond
was prejudicial error.
This court held the misconduct complained of,
if any, was not substantial and did not constitute
a ground for reversal of the penalty phase of the
trial. It felt that the remarks when viewed in con-
text could be fairly construed as provoked by the
defense counsel's improper argument that the
prosecutor had failed to attack Saunders' back-
ground and as a consequence had not shown that
Saunders lacked redeeming qualities. The court
reasoned a prosecutor is justified in making com-
ments in rebuttal which, although they might be
considered improper in other circumstances, are
responsive to the argument of the defense counsel
and based on the record. Since the defense counsel
first urged the jury to draw inferences from the
prosecutor's failure to ask Saunders certain ques-
tions, the prosecutor was entitled to meet this argu-
ment and could not be charged with misconduct for
comments which were only a slight departure from
propriety. Thus the court held the prosecutor's
statements did not violate Saunders' privilege
against self-incrimination and the prosecutor was
not guilty of misconduct because there was no
disadvantage to Saunders as the result of the ex-
change between his counsel and the prosecutor; the
prosecutor's response was not framed in such a way
as to be a direct invitation to the jury to draw
adverse inferences, itwas not unduly emphasized,
and it was related to the matters under considera-
tion on the penalty issue.
Comment: This case presents the question
whether improper remarks made by defense counsel
can be used to justify statements by the prosecutor
which would otherwise be in violation of the de-
fendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The
prosecutor's statements were clearly a comment on
the defendant's failure to testify except on the issue
of voluntariness of confession. The holding of
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) that the
19681
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Fifth Amendment, in its application to the states
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids
comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence, would require, absent the remarks made
by the defense counsel, the prosecutor's remarks
to be held reversible error.
On the basis of People v. Kirkes, 249 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1952), it seems that the defense counsel's remarks
should not be a factor in determining the propriety
of the prosecutor's statements. Kirkes declares a
prosecutor's misconduct cannot be justified on the
ground that the defense counsel committed a
similar impropriety. The court distinguished the
present case from Kirkes on the basis that the
prosecutor did not commit misconduct.
The rationale used to distinguish this case from
Kirkes was itself in conflict with the holding in
Kirkes. This court reasoned the prosecutor was not
guilty of misconduct because the statements he
made were no more improper than those made by
the defense counsel and merely cancelled the effect
of the defense counsel's statements. This is an at-
tempt to justify the prosecutor's misconduct on the
ground that the defense counsel committed a simi-
lar impropriety.
The cancelling aspect of the prosecutor's state-
ments is not a suitable basis for the decision. While
it is clear that the defense counsel first made im-
proper remarks that were to the disadvantage of
the People, if the effect of these remarks cannot be
offset by instructing the jury to disregard them, it
would be much better to retry the case than to at-
tempt to put both sides back in balance by allowing
the prosecutor to make an improper statement
in reply.
The court also distinguished the present case
from Kirkes on the basis that in this case the prose-
cutor did not depart from the record or commit
other misconduct in his statement. This is unsatis-
factory because, if the prosecutor's comment on
Saunders' failure to testify violated Saunders'
rights under the Fifth Amendment, it makes no
difference at all that the comment conformed to the
record in the case.
Improper Remarks By Judge Reversible Error-
Dunfee v. State, 412 S.W.2d 614 (Ark. 1967). De-
fendants appealed a jury verdict convicting them of
assault with intent to kill. Their main contention
was that certain remarks by the trial judge during
cross-examination prejudiced the jury against
them. Defense counsel, questioning a witness for
the prosecution, said:
Q. You had that pretty well memorized, didn't
you.
mn. coxEY: Now, that's not fair-
counT: Now everybody is presumed to be
telling the truth, Mr. Coffelt, each side.
(Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that this
statement by the judge constituted prejudicial
error.
Inflammatory Comments In Closing Argument
Before A Jury-Adams v. State, 192 So.2d 762 (Fla.
1966). Defendant appealed a murder conviction
and death sentence. It was found by the jury that
the defendant broke into a store and killed a cashier
while fighting with him. Defendant argued that it
was reversible error for the state's attorney, in his
closing argument, to remark that the victim of this
crime might be the wife or daughter of a juror. Part
of his statement was:
When you go home tonight, I ask you to just
think if your wife wasn't there because she had
been murdered by a robber, and I ask you
what you would feel about that? Or your
daughter, who is working for a living trying to
live....
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that these
remarks were inflammatory and prejudicial.
Search Invalidated As Invasion Of Curtilage-
Gonzales v. Beto, 266 F.Supp. 751 (W.D. Tex.,
1967). Petitioner, serving a sentence for illegal
possession of narcotics, applied for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that the evidence used to con-
vict him was obtained in violation of his constitu-
tional rights.
While keeping the residence in which the peti-
tioner was a guest under surveillance, four police
officers and an agent of the Liquor Control Board
of Texas trespassed in the yard and garage of the
residence. One police officer looked into a number
of windows, at one point standing on a drainpipe
protruding from the house to get a better view. The
officer observed the petitioner and his companions
capping heroin. The officers broke into the
residence, arrested the petitioner and his com-
panions, and seized the heroin and other evidence.
It was on this evidence and the testimony of the
officers that the petitioner was convicted.
Granting the application for the writ of habeas
corpus, the United States District Court reasoned
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that, while mere physical invasion of land will not
invalidate a search otherwise valid, the protection
of the Fourth Amendment is co-extensive with the
area around a residence known at common law as
the curtilage. The court held that the repeated
trespass of the officers was invasion of the curtilage,
that peering into the residence was an invalid
search, and that the trial court should have granted
the petitioner's motion to exclude the evidence
obtained in this manner.
Comment: Although the court based its decision
on invasion of the curtilage, it was hesitant to turn
the application of the safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment solely on a principle of ancient prop-
erty law. But the court was satisfied that the ques-
tion of physical invasion was reasonably related to
the problem of invasion of privacy. Thus while it
found ample authority for its holding that informa-
tion obtained through invasion of the curtilage
could not form the basis of a valid arrest and search
incident thereto, the consideration that these
trespasses also involved the invasion of privacy of
occupants of an occupied dwelling house was ap-
parently an important factor to the court in reach-
ing this decision.
Probable Cause For Warrantless Arrest-United
States v. Davis, 265 F.Supp. 358 (W.D.Pa., 1967).
After indictment for possession and transportation
of distilled spirits in unstamped containers, defend-
ant moved to suppress and have returned evidence
seized by an Internal Revenue Agent.
After stopping defendant's car, and without giv-
ing any Miranda warnings, the agent inquired as
to what defendant was carrying. Defendant re-
plied, "You know what I've got", and upon request
he opened the trunk of the car in which the agent
found twenty-five gallons of moonshine. Defendant
was placed under arrest and the contraband was
seized.
In denying defendant's motion, the District
Court held that the Internal Revenue Agent had
sufficient probable cause to make a lawful arrest
without a warrant and therefore, the subsequent
search of the car and seizure of the contraband was
validly made incident to the lawful arrest. Al-
though defendant's admissions to the agent prior to
the search were excluded as a factor in establishing
probable cause for arrest, the court found it was
established apart from any admissions by (1) in-
formation received from a reliable informant; (2)
confirmation of that information by the agent; (3)
the heavily loaded appearance of defendant's car;
and (4) the reputation of defendant as a known
liquor law violator.
Defendant's admissions were excluded because
he was not advised of his constitutional rights as
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires
when a person has been taken into custody or de-
prived of his freedom of action in a significant way.
Following the decision in Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959), the court held that the point of
arrest was when the agent stopped defendant's
car. It was then that the accusatory stage had been
reached and the defendant, as a practical matter,
was "deprived of his freedom of action in a signifi-
cant way".
Comment: From the language in Miranda, the
required warnings would seem to accrue at the
point suggested by the court, because upon stop-
ping the car defendant was, indeed, significantly
deprived of his freedom of action. Much of the
Miranda opinion, however, stressed the coercive
psychological factors of modern day in-custody
interregation and the consequential need for pro-
cedures to apprise accused persons of their consti-
tutional rights. Among these factors were conduct-
ing the questioning in a strange atmosphere, or in
the privacy of a room cut off from the outside
world, which has the effect of suggesting the in-
vincibility of the forces of the law.
In the case of stopping a person's car, however,
most of the psychological factors of in-custody
interrogation are absent. Thus, it would appear
that in this case the language of the holding in
Miranda applies but much of the rationale upon
which that holding is based does not.
Contraband In Plain View May Be Siezed Sub-
sequent To An Emergency Entry-State v. Puryear,
227 A.2d 139 (N.J. Super.Ct. 1967). The defendant
was convicted for knowingly possessing lottery
slips and the appellate court affirmed.
The police broke into the defendant's apartment
in reply to an emergency request of an investigator
of the Newark Air Pollution Control Board. This
apartment was the apparent source of a dangerous
coal gas odor. Once inside they extinguished several
sulphur candles causing the odor and in the process
observed adding machines and slips of paper which
"looked suspicious". Detectives found adding
machines and lottery slips in plain view. Upon
further search they found the defendant's driver's
license and some unpaid bills addressed to him in
a dresser drawer in the bedroom. Puryear, who was
soon arrested, possessed two keys to the apartment.
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He was shown to be one of the officers and directors
of the realty company which owned the building in
question. In view of this evidence the court found
him guilty of being in knowing control and pos-
session of gambling equipment.
At the pretrial hearing the defendant made
motions to suppress the evidence seized on two
grounds. His first ground was based on a Newark
ordinance requiring that all information obtained
by representatives of the Air Pollution Board, ex-
cept as it directly relates to pollution, shall be
kept strictly confidential and used for no other
purpose than the enforcement of the Pollution
Ordinance.
The court in overruling this contention said that
the nondisclosure provisions of this ordinance were
inapplicable to policemen. It said that as investi-
gators of gas leaks they retained their independent
capacity and did not become agents of the Pollu-
tion Board.
The defendant's second ground was that this
evidence was a "fruit of the poison tree" since
searches without warrants are illegal except with
consent or incidental to a lawful arrest. The court,
however, found this to be a situation that fell
under the exceptional circumstances doctrine
announced in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1948). While the Supreme Court of the United
States has never employed this doctrine to permit
a search following a lawful entry for an emergency,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d. 543 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964), held that
police entering an apartment after hearing screams
in the night and therein discovering counterfeit
money in the commode, could sieze and use it in a
subsequent prosecution for possession of counterfeit
money with intent to defraud.
The present court in following the Second
Circuit's opinion, said that once the police had
lawfully entered the apartment it was both their
right and duty to sieze all contraband lying in plain
view. Moreover, it was of no moment that detec-
tives were later called to investigate the nature of
the materials found since their expertise in this
area might have saved the defendant the ordeal of
arrest if the slips were not lottery tickets. It there-
fore upheld the lower court in overruling defend-
ant's objection to the admission of the tickets and
machines into evidence.
Comment: This case and the Barone case both
involved seizure of contraband. The possession of
the objects was in itself a crime. The police have a
duty to seize such objects as part of their duty to
prevent crime. It is only reasonable to permit them
to make a further search in an effort to discover
the identity of the offender. This situation might
well be distinguished from seizure of objects, the
possession of which is legal, which nevertheless
arouse suspicion for other reasons.
Motel Manager's Consent Validates Search Of
Room-People v. Raine, 58 Cal.Rptr. 753 (Dist.
Ct.App. 1967). The defendant was convicted of
burglary and forgery. At the trial, evidence seized
from the motel room which he had shared with his
wife was offered. The defendant's main contention
on appeal was that the search by which this evi-
dence was obtained was illegal and that, without
such evidence, the testimony of his accomplice was
not sufficiently corroborated.
The defendant's wife registered for a double
room at a motel. When the manager became wor-
ried by the size of the bill, he checked the informa-
tion given on the registration card and found it was
false. An investigation of the car defendant was
driving disclosed that it was stolen. The defendant
and his wife were arrested for car theft about 6:30
A.M. A short time later the manager contacted the
sheriff's office to inquire about payment of the
bill. He overheard the defendant's wife say, "We
don't have a dime". A deputy told the manager
that "they weren't going to be able to pay it".
Between 9:00 and 9:30 A.M. some officers asked
to search the motel room. The manager consented
and unlocked the door. Evidence linking the
defendant to the crimes for which he was con-
victed was found behind a baseboard in the room.
After the search, the manager had the belongings
of the defendant and his wife removed from the
room and stored.
Since the search was made without a warrant
and was not incident to an arrest; since neither the
defendant nor his wife had expressly or impliedly
consented to the search, and since the record would
not support the conclusion that the motel manager
had been authorized by either of the occupants to
permit such a search, the court noted the search
was lawful only if the right of the defendant and
his wife to the occupancy of the room had termi-
nated. It held the manager regained the right to
complete control of the room when the occupants
left and that his consent to the search made it
lawful.
The court rejected the defendant's contention
that his tenancy did not terminate until the check-
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out time (11:00 A.M.), reasoning that the manager
could have made a request for payment at any
time. Upon being told they had no money and
would be unable to pay, he could have required the
defendant and his wife to end their occupancy of
the room. The court also reasoned that when a
day-to-day room guest of a motel leaves without
intending to occupy the room any longer and with-
out making any arrangement for payment of the
bill, there is an inference of abandonment of the
tenancy. Thus the management need not wait
until checkout time to reoccupy the room, even
though the guest leaves personal belongings in it.
Comment: This court was cognizant of the
limitations placed upon it by Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964), where the United States
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use of
"strained applications of the law of agency",
"unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority' ",
or "subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of private
property law" as the basis of finding effective
waiver of Fourth Amendment protection. The
Stoner case was concerned with third party consent.
This court avoided the Stoner limitations by de-
ciding the manager had regained control of the
room and that it was thus unnecessary to consider
his consent as that of a third party.
Once the court made this decision, it found sup-
port for its holding in another California case,
People v. Crayton, 344 P.2d 627 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959). This case involved a motel manager who
removed the defendant's belongings since it was
after checkout time. While so engaged, he con-
sented to a police search of the room the defendant
had occupied. The court in Crayton held this con-
sent made the search lawful because the manager
had complete control of the premises as was shown
by his right to remove the defendant's belongings
and prepare the room for another occupant. It was
clear the manager had regained control of the
room. It was past checkout time and his right to
remove the occupant's belongings had been exer-
cised.
In the present case the facts do not so clearly
show the manager had control of the room when
he consented to the search. He could have asked
for payment of the bill at any time and could have
required the defendant and his wife to leave when
he found out they would not be able to pay. But
at the time of the search here he had not exercised
his right to remove their belongings and thus re-
gain control. It does not seem just that the manager
should be able to, in effect, waive a fundamental
constitutional right of the defendant on the basis
of his right to enter the room to remove the occu-
pants' belongings. Until the manager has entered
for this purpose, the occupants have a personal
right to privacy in the room. The fact that the
manager later took this action and regained control
does not validate his consent prior to the time when
he had this control.
When the manager is not considered to have
regained control of the room prior to the consent,
the validity of the search must be determined on
the basis of third party consent law and in light of
the language in Stoner that "... . it was the peti-
tioner's constitutional right which was at stake
here, and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It
was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner
could waive by word or deed, either directly or
through an agent" 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964). Since
there is nothing in the present case to suggest the
manager was the agent of the defendant and his
wife, his consent could not be a waiver of the de-
fendant's right to freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. As long as the defendant
and his wife retained this personal right in the mo-
tel room, the manager should not have been able to
make an effective consent to the search of the room
on the basis of his property interest.
Search Of Longshoreman's Automobiles Valid
As Border Search-United States v. McGlone,
266 F.Supp. 673 (E.D., Va. 1967). The defendants
were found guilty of the theft of goods moving as
part of a shipment in foreign commerce. A customs
official working on a foreign vessel advised other
customs officials that a large quantity of mer-
chandise was missing from the ship. These officials
suspected longshoremen of pilfering. On this basis,
without a warrant or information pointing specifi-
cally to the defendants (who were two of the
longshoremen working on the dock), a customs port
investigator searched the cars of the defendants
and found part of the missing merchandise in each
of them.
The district court noted the investigator did not
have probable cause to suspect the defendants,
and therefore the searches could be sustained, and
information obtained through them could be
admitted in evidence, only if they were in the
nature of border searches which can be made with-
out a search warrant or probable cause. See Ham-
mond v. United States, 356 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1966).
The court stated that even though the defendants
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were not being tried for a customs violation, the
evidence revealed they had committed such a
violation in removing the goods from customs
custody. Although the defendants remained within
the country at all times and did not make an
attempt to introduce anything into the country
illegally, the searches were valid under customs
statutes and regulations which authorize customs
officials to investigate when goods on which duty
has not been paid disappear from the custody of
customs agents.
The court reasoned that a search for stolen goods
liable to duties has never been held subject to the
same strict requirements as the search and seizure
of a man's private papers and documents, and that
the same considerations which have led other
courts to permit border searches upon mere sus-
picion were present in this case. Broad search
powers have been conferred upon customs agents
to prevent contraband goods entering the country
and to enforce the payment of duty on goods
legally brought into the country. While these
defendants were not responsible for the payment
of duty themselves, they were responsible for the
non-payment of duty on the goods they took since
they took these goods before a customs entry was
made. The district court felt the need for effective
enforcement of customs statutes and regulations
outweighed the defendants' right of privacy. It
held that, under the circumstances, the searches
were reasonable, the result of the searches was
admissible in evidence, and the guilt of the de-
fendants was clearly established.
Comment: This decision holds that officers
searching for contraband goods, or goods on which
duty has not been paid, are not subject to the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. As the
court recognizes, this is a broad interpretation of
the concept of a "border search". The interpreta-
tion is so broad that it severely limits the privilege
against unreasonable searches and seizures guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment. According to
this decision, a search for contraband goods or
goods on which the duty has not been paid would
be sustained on mere suspicion, no matter how
long the goods have been in the country, how far
from the border they have been transported, or how
many times they have changed hands.
The concept of border searches should be nar-
rowly restricted since it detracts from a funda-
mental right. A better test for the validity of a
border search would have to include consideration
of such factors as time of entry of the goods,
proximity to the border of the place searched, and
whether or not the person against whom the
search is directed is the one who was responsible
for bringing the goods into the country, as well as
the "payment of duty" or "contraband goods"
tests used by this court.
Inventory Of Car Is Not A Search Of It-
Heffly v. State, 423 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1967). While
operating his automobile, the defendant was the
subject of a lawful arrest for illegal possession of
firearms. After taking the defendant and his auto-
mobile to the police station, the arresting officer
made a thorough search of the vehicle for the pur-
pose of making an inventory. On the floor by the
rear seat he found two passports and two certifi-
cates of registration which he listed along with the
other items found in the automobile. The police
questioned the defendant concerning these items
and subsequently learned of a nearby burglary
involving similar items. Defendant confessed to the
burglary and was convicted.
The issue on appeal was whether the passports
and certificates of registrations were fruits of an
illegal search and therefore should not have been
admitted in evidence at his trial. The Nevada
Supreme Court held that where the search is con-
ducted for inventory, not for exploratory, purposes,
articles found as a result, which later supplied the
foundation for a reasonable suspicion on the part
of the police, were not the subjects of an unlawful
search and seizure.
The court stressed the duty of police officers to
take inventories of impounded vehicles to safeguard
the owners and defeat subsequent dishonest claims
of theft. The concurring judge placed further stress
on the "reasonable suspicion" test. Under this
test, the items found were of such a nature that
they clearly did not belong to the defendant and
therefore placed an obligation on the officer who
discovered them to continue his investigation.
Comment: As stated by Justice Zenoff in He.fly,
the distinction between inventory and exploratory
searches is a difficult one to make and must depend
on the facts of each individual case. The exclusion-
ary rule was created to protect rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and to make it unprofitable for police
to attempt to avoid those rights. For the protection
of society and individual rights the test must
necessarily be the reasonableness of the search and
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subsequent investigation. Given the reasonableness
of an inventory as the only practical means of
preventing dishonest claims, the decision of Hefly
necessarily follows. But it may be argued that
other means could be used to attain the goals of
an inventory. For example, the automobile might
be sealed until reclaimed by its owner. Because of
the difficulties in formulating workable alternatives
however, the various courts must proceed on a
case by case basis as to whether the facts showed a
true search or only an inventory.
Equal Possession Or Use Rights Required To
Validate Consent Search-People v. Rodriquez,
223 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. App. 1967). Defendant, con-
victed of burglary, appealed on the ground that
items admitted into evidence were seized during
an illegal search of his room. The Appellate Court
of Illinois held the search unconstitutional and
reversed the conviction.
Consent to the search was given to the police
by a woman living with the defendant for two
months and whom the defendant referred to as
his wife. The woman was not a full-time resident
of the room and she kept her clothes at her mother's
apartment. She did not pay a portion of the rent
and did not have a key to the apartment.
The court held that she had no right to consent
to the search, distinguishing cases where consent
to a search was given by a sister who was a resident
of the defendant's house, People v. Walker, 213
N.E.2d 552 (Ill. 1966); where consent was given
by a tenant of the defendant and the evidence was
found in a room of common usage, People v.
Palmer, 187 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1963); and where
consent was given by a woman who had a key to
the apartment and was living with the defendant,
Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965).
The court found no evidence in the present case
that the woman had an equal right to the use and
possession of the premises. There were no familial
relationships nor property rights connected with
the premises. She did not have sole or joint control
over the property. There was no proof that she
had authority to invite friends. Her rights were
only those of a guest and, as such, she did not have
the right to consent to the search.
Search Of Automobile Trunk Reasonable-
People v. Brown, 221 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. App. 1966).
Convicted of theft, defendants appealed on the
ground that the warrantless search of their automo-
bile trunk was unreasonable. The appellate court
rejected this argument and held that the trial
court was correct in denying a motion to suppress
the evidence.
Defendants Brown and Sulauka were stopped
by a police officer at 1:30 A.M. for failure to have
state license plates on their vehicle. Brown, who
was unable to produce a driver's license, claimed
he was coming from a used car lot where he had
just purchased the car. While questioning Brown,
the officer noticed appellant Sulauka sleeping in
the back seat next to a set of golf clubs and some
clothing. Upon further questioning, each defendant
gave a conflicting account of where they were
coming from, where they were going, and why the
goods were in the back seat. The officer then
decided to search the trunk of the vehicle; in the
search he discovered two sets of golf dubs, shirts,
raincoats, golf balls, and some golf shoes. This
search was the subject of the motion to suppress.
The appellants contended the search was im-
proper, citing People v. Lewis, 215 N.E.2d 283
(Ill. 1966). In that case the police stopped the
appellants' vehicle early in the evening for running
a red light. Noticing that the license number of
the automobile was one wanted in connection with
a burglary, the police searched the car and found
burglar tools in the trunk. The Illinois Supreme
Court held the search unreasonable since the
defendant was only arrested for a minor traffic
offense and since a search warrant could probably
have been obtained before the defendant could
dispose of the tools.
The appellate court did not consider the Lewis
case controlling. Instead, the court found the
circumstances sufficient to arouse a "reasonable
suspicion" on the part of the officer that the appel-
lants might have been more than ordinary traffic
violators. Because of "the lateness of the hour,
the arousing of the suspicions of the police by the
pile of goods in the back seat of the car and the
discrepancies in the stories related by the two
appellants," the appellate court affirmed the refusal
of the trial court to suppress the evidence.
Comment: The Illinois Supreme Court in the
Lewis case said:
The present search, however, was pursuant to
an arrest solely for a traffic violation and could
not be reasonably required to discover the
fruits of the crime. It was rather a general
search without a warrant in an obvious at-
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tempt to discover evidence of other criminal
activity.
In that case the police searched the car only on
discovering that its license number was one wanted
in connection with a burglary.
In the present case the court held that a "rea-
sonable suspicion" was aroused under all the
circumstances. The court emphasized that the
lateness of the hour (1:30 A.M.) made it difficult
for the police to obtain a search warrant. It would
seem, however, that this was not sufficient justifica-
tion for the search. The search could not lawfully
be made incident to an arrest for failure to have
license plates on the car. Therefore, the officer
must have had probable cause to believe a crime
had been committed or was being committed by
the appellants.
Although the United States Supreme Court has
held that, due to the mobility of cars, questions
involving the search of cars differ from those
stemming from the search of fixed structures, the
court still uses the test of whether the search was
reasonable under the circumstances. See Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). To allow
a search to be made for such a general reason as
"a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
that they were dealing with something more serious
than a mere violation of the Motor Vehicle Code"
would seem to allow an officer greater latitude in
conducting a search without a search warrant than
with one.
Search Of Automobile Held Reasonable-State
v. Boykins, 232 A.2d 141 (N.J. 1967). Defendant,
who was indicted for possession of a narcotic drug,
was granted a pre-trial order suppressing evidence
obtained by the search of an automobile in which
he was a passenger. The superior court, appellate
division affirmed the order. But the Supreme
Court of New Jersey reversed and held the evidence
admissible.
Police officers observed the automobile in which
the accused was a passenger traveling at high
speed. The officers pulled up next to it, identified
themselves, and directed its driver to pull over to
the curb. The driver initially indicated that he
would do so. But when the light changed, "he
took off with the wheels screeching," attempting
to smash into the police vehicle. The officers chased
the automobile at speeds exceeding sixty miles
per hour and finally caught it. At this time the
defendant and the other occupants of the car fled
on foot, halting only after the officers fired warning
shots. An immediate search of the defendant and
the others revealed nothing incriminating. But a
search of the vehicle disclosed an open knife and
an envelope containing marijuana under the front
seat.
The trial court suppressed the evidence. It
ruled that the search was not valid as an incident
to a lawful arrest, because this search was not
necessary to protect the arresting officer from
attack, to prevent escape or to prevent destruction
of evidence since the occupants were in custody
and no longer in the automobile.
In reversing, the supreme court held that the
suspicious behavior of the occupants of the car
gave the officers reasonable cause to believe "that
there was something illicit about them or the car"
and hence gave the officers the right to search the
vehicle.
The court conceded that every traffic violation
will not justify a search of the offender's car. Also,
the court agreed that the trial court correctly
decided that the search was not incident to the
arrest. But pointing out that the Fourth Amend-
ment forbids only unreasonable searches, the
court decided that a search incident to a lawful
arrest is only one category and does not exhaust
the subject of reasonable searches without a war-
rant. Here the validity of the search depended
upon the officers' reasonable cause to believe that
the contents of the automobile were illegal. This
belief was engendered by the unusual behavior
and flight of the defendant. The court based its
conclusion on the usefulness of the automobile as
an implement of crime, and emphasized that the
officers might reasonably expect at least to find a
weapon under such strange circumstances.
Balancing the necessity of such searches to
implement the public's interest in law enforcement
against the nature of the search, the court found
that the search was reasonable. Because of the
mobility of the automobile, to require stricter
grounds for search would unduly hamper police
in law enforcement. Furthermore, the court saw
little threat to the privacy of law-abiding citizens
in such a search. It does not resemble the general
warrant, but is confined to a small and specific
area. And it does not invade important areas of
privacy such as the home or business.
Comment: This case is in accord with the current
reasoning of the courts concerning searches of
automobiles. The Supreme Court has recently
emphasized that the fact that automobiles are
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constantly movable may make search of such a
vehicle without a warrant reasonable when the
result would be opposite in the search of a home or
a store. Cooper v. California 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
See also, Walker v. State 397 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 864 (1966).
Alteration Of Marginal Figures On Check Is
Not Forgery-State v. Peterson, 192 So.2d 293
(Fla. Ct. App. 1966). Defendant was charged with
forging a check. The circuit court quashed the
information on the motion of defendant, and the
state appealed. The Florida District Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The court directed its opinion toward the issue
of whether the alteration of the marginal figures
on a check, leaving intact the written amount to
be paid, constituted forgery as charged in the
information. By inserting the figure "4" before
the figures "6.50", the payee-defendant had been
able to negotiate the check for $46.50 even though
the writing "Six and 50/100 Dollars" remained
unaltered. The appellate court held that this
constituted the lesser offense of alteration, but not
forgery. To be a forgery, the alteration must be
material, creating a falsity in the apparent legal
efficacy of the instrument. Where there is no change
in the apparent obligations of the parties as ex-
pressed in the instrument, there is no forgery.
As authority for this proposition, the court cited
Turnipseed v. State, 33 So. 851 (Fla. 1903), a case
which held that an alteration in a contract which
did not affect the parties' obligations as expressed
by that document did not constitute a forgery.
The sole remaining question was whether the
particular alteration in this case was of such a
nature as to change the apparent obligations of
the parties. The Florida law on negotiable instru-
ments, F.S.A., § 674.19(1), provides that where
"the sum payable is expressed in words and also
in figures and there is a discrepancy between the
two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum
payable". Defendant's alteration was therefore
not a material one and he was not guilty of forgery.
As the court pointed out, the state should have
proceeded against the defendant on the theory of
cheating and fraud.
Comment: The Florida law on negotiable instru-
ments which is quoted above represents the
majority rule. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in State v. Lotono, 58 S.E. 621 (W. Va.
1907), confronted with a similar case, stated that
"The test is the legal effect of the change or altera-
tion, not whether someone may be misled or de-
ceived by the paper."
No Duty To Inform Of Parole Ineligibility
When Accepting Guilty Plea-Trujillo v. United
States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1967). The defendant
and his co-defendant were indicted on three counts:
concealing marijuana, failure to pay the transfer
tax on a sale, and unlawful sale of marijuana. The
defendant plead guilty to count three-unlawful
sale. He was advised by the judge that if convicted
under this count he would receive a minimum
sentence of five years with no possibility of proba-
tion. Hearing this, Trujillo adhered to his plea of
guilty.
One week later the two defendants were sen-
tenced. At this time the district judge informed the
co-defendant he would not be eligible for parole,
but did not turn to Trujillo and similarly advise
him. Defendant was sentenced to ten years on
this count and count two, the sentences to run
concurrently. Defendant thereafter moved to have
the sentence vacated, insisting that he should have
been informed, prior to the entry of his plea, that
parole would not be possible.
In affirming the denial of this motion by the
district court, the court of appeals admitted that
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
a court to be certain an accused understands the
consequences of his plea before accepting it. It
affirmed, however, on the ground that ineligibility
for parole is not one of the consequences about
which a defendant must be informed.
The court reasoned that the rule of explanation
did not require that every "but for" consequence
of a plea of guilty be explained. The defendant
need not be informed that conviction might lead
to loss of a passport or other curtailment of civil
liberties. In analogizing these and eligibility for
parole, the court cited with approval Smith v.
United States, 324 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
holding that parole eligibility was not a "conse-
quence" of a plea of guilty but a matter of legisla-
tive grace, and a denial of such eligibility was only
a withholding of that grace.
Comment: While it is obvious that a judge
should not have to inform a defendant of every
conceivable effect a guilty plea may entail, the
court's holding seems to favor form over substance
and in so doing defeats the purpose of requiring
that a defendant be informed of the consequences
of a possible conviction on the plea. It is doubtful
that a defendant will be greatly swayed in his plea
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because of his knowledge or ignorance of the fact
that a conviction may lead to the loss of his pass-
port or even, perhaps, his right to vote. What the
defendant wishes to know and what the rule was
apparently designed to tell him, is the number of
years of imprisonment he faces from such a con-
viction. If the sentence is likely to be short and
the defense is fairly weak, the defendant may well
decide to serve his time and have done with it.
On the other hand, the defendant may wish to
pursue even the faintest hopes of acquittal when
many years of his life hang in the balance. In the
present case the difference between eligibility and
ineligibility for parole was six years and eight
months, since 18 U.S.C. § 4202 generally allows
the release of a prisoner after he has served one-
third of his sentence. While such release is not
assured, it is at least a good possibility. Informing
the defendant that a narcotics conviction made
such parole impossible might well have caused
him to enter a different plea. At least Trujillo
should have been given this choice.
Discriminatory Enforcement Of Village Ordi-
nance A Denial Of Equal Protection Of The Laws-
Village of Fairlawn v. Fuller, 221 N.E.2d 851
(Akron, Ohio Mun. Ct., 1966). The 37 defendants,
all employed by the Giant Tiger Store in the
Village of Fairlawn, Ohio, were prosecuted for
violation of a village ordinance forbidding the
transaction of business on Sunday. The cases were
initiated in the Mayor's Court of the Village of
Fairlawn but were later transferred to the Munici-
pal Court of Akron. All defendants entered pleas
of "no contest," which constituted, as set out in
Section 2937.07, Revised Code, ".... a stipulation
that the judge or magistrate may make a finding
of guilty or not guilty from the explanation of cir-
cumstances. . . ." Lacking a definition for "ex-
planation of the circumstances," the municipal
court concluded that the statements and briefs of
counsel for both sides fell within this term and
consequently made its findings from the claims not
directly controverted in the statements and briefs.
These findings led the court to dismiss the prosecu-
tion on the grounds that the defendants had not
been accorded the equal protection of the laws.
The court found "a clear showing of discrimina-
tory enforcement" and concluded that:
1. During the period following the passage of
the ordinance, the only persons prosecuted at
the instance of the village authorities for
violation of the ordinance, were employees of
the Giant Tiger Store, and
2. While proceeding with considerable vigor
against the employees of the Giant Tiger
Store, the village authorities knowingly per-
mitted violations of the ordinance by other
persons.
Among those village officials found to have con-
sciously discriminated in the enforcement of the
ordinance was the mayor.
Based on its findings, the court held:
It is a basic rule of law... that an offender
cannot excuse his violation of the law by
showing that others equally guilty have not
been prosecuted.... But where, as in the
cases now before this court, it is shown that
there was intentional discrimination-when
the persons directly charged with enforcement
of the ordinance chose to prosecute particular
violators and to permit other violators to
proceed unmolested with their full knowledge
and approval, the court must dismiss the
prosecution, not-because the defendants are
not guilty of the offense charged-but because
a court cannot take part in or countenance
prosecutions conducted in violation of the
constitutional rights of the defendants. The
courts, above all other agencies of govern-
ment, are bound to accord to all persons the
equal protection of the laws.
Flight Instruction Is Prejudicial-Quarles v.
State, 199 So.2d 58 (Miss. 1967). Defendant ap-
pealed a conviction of manslaughter. The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court found that the verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence and
remanded the case for a new trial.
The badly beaten body of Oliva Collins had been
found in the bedroom of her home on January 31,
1966. The body was frozen and since freezing
temperatures had prevailed for a number of days
preceding the discovery of the body, it was not
known when she had been killed. The state theo-
rized that the decedent's failure to call at the post
office for her welfare check on January 26 indicated
that she was killed before that date. On January 31,
the same day the body was found, the defendant
went to Chicago.
After considering the evidence against the de-
fendant, which the court found to be weak and
circumstantial, the court turned to the question
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of the defendant's trip to Chicago. The court
found that no effort had been made to hide the
body, yet the defendant had remained in town at
least five days after the killing and that it did not
appear from the evidence that he knew of its
discovery when he did leave. The court also found
that the defendant and his witnesses had given a
believable account as to the defendant's reasons for
his trip to Chicago. In the light of these facts, the
court considered the following instruction given to
the jury on the issue of flight:
The Court instructs the jury for the State of
Mississippi that flight is a circumstance from
which as a matter of law the inference of guilty
knowledge and fear may be inferred and if you
believe from the evidence in this case beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Dotson
Quarles, fled and remained in flight and
hiding for a time after he killed Oliva Collins,
if you do believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant did kill Oliva Collins, and if
you further believe from the evidence in this
case beyond a reasonable doubt that he did
kill Oliva Collins with the intent to kill and
murder Oliva Collins, you may take such
flight or hiding into consideration along with
all the other evidence in this case in determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of said defendant,
Dotson Quarles.
The court held this instruction should not have
been given since it was confusing, misleading and
began with the assumption that the defendant
"fled and remained in flight and hiding for a time
after he killed Oliva Collins". According to the
court an inference of guilty knowledge may only
be drawn, under certain circumstances, from
"unexplained flight". The court further held that
an instruction on flight should only be used in
cases where the circumstance of flight has "con-
siderable probative value" and that, if used, the
instruction "should have been qualified so as to
be related to the facts of this case, and also to tell
the jury it must first find the facts before it can use
flight along with other circumstances to support an
inference of guilt".
Fourth Amendment Rights Of Prisoners And
Parolees-Smith v. State, 229 A.2d 723 (Md. 1967);
Stewart v. State, 229 A.2d 727 (Md. 1967); Echols v.
State, 201 So.2d 89 (Fla. D.Ct. App. 1967). De-
fendant Smith was convicted as a third offender as
a result of narcotics found in his possession during
a routine search of prison inmates as they returned
to the prison dormitory. The court ruled, in face of
the defendant's objection that the search was
illegal, that the requirements of prison security
and the absence of undue harassment or oppression
constituting cruel and unusual punishment satis-
fied constitutional requirements for a valid search
and seizure.
Defendant Stewart convicted of the possession
of narcotics, appealed on the grounds that the drug
was obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure. An assistant superintendent of a woman's
reformatory, forewarned that narcotics were being
smuggled into the institution, became suspicious
when the defendant and an inmate engaged in a
long and passionate kiss. Upon searching the
inmate she found a small package of heroin in her
mouth. The court said that a search of a prisoner
without a warrant which did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment was an exception to the
rule that searches required warrants. The exigencies
of prison security are sufficient to justify a search
without a warrant.
Defendant Echol appealed from a conviction of
being a felon in possession of firearms. He con-
tended that his arrest was illegal because it was done
without benefit of a warrant. Alerted to the pos-
sibility of prowlers in the area, the police stopped
the defendant who was 'lurking in the shadows".
He was arrested on a vagrancy charge and was
searched, at which time a revolver was discovered.
The defendant contended that there was no prob-
able cause to arrest him without a warrant since no
misdemeanor had been committed in the officers'
presence. After finding that there was sufficient
evidence upon which to justify the arrest, the court,
in an engaging dictum, said that the search would
have been legal even if the arrest were illegal since
the defendant was a parolee.
The court stated that since the parolee was con-
structively a prisoner, he stood in no better position
to protest a search than those actually confined in
prison. Even though the arresting officers did not
arrest the defendant as a parolee nor even know of
his status, the fact that he was a parolee and had
consented not to violate the law while on parole
effected a waiver of his right to object to the search.
Comment: The dicta of the court about the rights
of a parolee indicate the sad legal status of con-
victs and parolees. Though perhaps a search of
known parolees without a warrant can be justified,
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justification of an illegal search by the after-
discovered fact that defendant was a parolee seems
unwarranted. A search without a warrant is only
an exception, not the rule. It is only when the
police are aware that the suspect is a parolee and
are attempting to see whether he is complying
with the parole rules that a search without a war-
rant might be justified.
Consent Of Corporate Officer Not Bar To Prose-
cution For Wire-Tapping-Comnnonwealth v.
Spindel, 223 N.E.2d 511 (Mass. 1967). The de-
fendant was found guilty of the offense of eaves-
dropping. He was authorized by the chief executive
officer of a corporation to wire tap and place tape
recorders on telephones of the corporation. The
jury was instructed that proof of the tapping of any
wire shall be prima fade evidence of the crime of
eavesdropping unless duly authorized by a court
order and unless done with the consent of the
owner or person in control of the building.
In affirming the decision, the Supreme judicial
Court of Massachusetts noted that the statute
stated the requirements of court authorization and
consent of the owner or person in control. There
was no evidence of obtaining a court order, and
therefore the, evidence that the executive officer
had exclusive control of the building was insuffi-
cient to avoid the prima facie effect of the evidence
of wire tapping. The court rejected defendant's
position that the words, "unless duly authorized",
meant that authority to eavesdrop can be conferred
either by the court or by permission of a person
having exclusive control, holding that such an
interpretation would make the second condition
of consent of the owner redundant and meaning-
less.
Confession Induced By Arousing Emotion Of
Hope Involuntary-State v. Fuqua, 152 S.E.2d 68
(N.C. 1967). Defendant was found guilty of break-
ing, entering and larceny. He assigned as error the
ruling of the court below that his alleged confession
was voluntary.
At defendant's trial, an investigating police
officer testified on voir dire and in the absence of the
jury as to his conversation with defendant held in
a room of the Durham County jail after the arrest.
Responding to questions of counsel, the officer
gave the following testimony:
Q. You said, Mr. Cook, you didn't promise
him anything, but you did say if he would
tell what he knew about it you would testify
he had been cooperative?
A. Yes, sir, I told him if he wanted to talk to
me then I would be able to testify that he
talked to me and was cooperative.
The superior court ruled that defendant confessed
freely and voluntarily, without fear or hope, after
being advised of his constitutional rights.
In ordering a new trial for defendant, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina held that the
officer's statement was such that defendant could
gather hope of lighter punishment by confessing.
The total circumstances of the confession impels
the conclusion that defendant's "emotion of hope"
was aroused so as to render the confession in-
voluntary and as a matter of law inadmissible in
evidence. "A confession obtained by the slightest
emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected."
State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259(1827).
Comment: On similar facts, the same result has
been reached in other jurisdictions. For example,
a confession was held involuntary when obtained
following a statement to defendant that if he told
the truth, the sheriff would do whatever he could
for him. People -. Gonzales, 69 P. 487 (Cal. 1902).
Similarly, a confession obtained after officers told
defendants it would be better for them to tell the
truth and that the state's attorney might show
them leniency was held involuntary. People v.
Heide, 135 N.E. 77 (Ill. 1922). But a confession
following an officer saying that it would go easier
for defendant in court if he made a statement has
also been held to be voluntary as merely a sugges-
tion of the advisability of making such statement.
People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. 1964).
In determining the question of voluntariness, it
appears the courts attempt to distinguish remarks
which are only suggestions to make a statement
from those which the accused may interpret as
offering some inducement to confess. This distinc-
tion, of course, is not always clear. Thus, whether
the remarks are considered by the courts to have
been an inducement may ultimately turn on other
factors surrounding the confession.
Volunteered Confession Before Arrest Not
Within Miranda Protection-State v. Oxentine, 154
S.E.2d 529 (N.C., 1967). The defendant was con-
victed of manslaughter and sentenced to fourteen
to eighteen years in the killing of Edgar Wheatly.
Several eye witnesses to the crime testified that dur-
ing a' party at the defendant's home he went into
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his bedroom and reappeared with a .22 caliber
rifle. Without any apparent reason he twice shot
the deceased, one bullet going through his heart.
Deputy Sheriff Triplett, arriving a short time
after the shooting, testified that he asked a lady
at the scene what had happened. She replied, "Fred
Oxentine shot him" and the defendant at this point
volunteered from across the room, "Yes, I shot
him". The defendant denies this statement and
objects to the trial court's admitting it into evi-
dence since he had not been provided with a warn-
ing of the possible consequences of a statement, as
required in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in uphold-
ing the trial court's ruling, quoted the holding in
the Miranda decision that makes the requirement
of these warnings dependent upon taking the
accused into custody or otherwise depriving him
of his freedom. The court concluded that here the
defendant was not in such a position.
Fingerprint Card Admissible As A "Business
Record"-People v. Crosslin, 60 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Ct.
App. 1967). Mrs. Rose Ferrando, who worked at
Charlie's Liquor Storein East Palo Alto, California,
testified that on October 11, 1963 a man placed a
can of Country Club beer on the counter and or-
dered her to open the cash register. She refused
and after a heated argument, the assailant shot
her in the leg and went towards the cash register.
Still undaunted, Mrs. Ferrando began to scuffle
with the man, whereupon he struck her on the
head. Mrs. Ferrando then ran outside to get help
and the man fled. Mrs. Ferrando's daughter,
Joanna, testified that she was washing dishes in
the back when she heard a gunshot and came
forward to see what was happening. Seeing the
assailant ordering her mother to open the cash
register, she stepped on the alarm.
Neither lady was able to identify the defendant
as the attacker, but Joanna testified she did recog-
nize his voice in a police line up, when he said,
"This is a holdup."
The deputy sheriff, who went to the liquor store
shortly after the robbery, refused to allow anyone
to touch the Country Club beer can until a crimi-
nologist arrived. The expert discovered several
latent fingerprints on the can and by comparing
these with fingerprints on a card, reputed to con-
tain the defendant's fingerprints, he determined
that the defendant had handled the can.
The card, which was introduced into evidence,
was said to contain the defendant's prints. The
card, according to a captain of the San Mateo
Sheriff's Office, was a part of the records of the
office. The office contained a complete fingerprint-
ing system. The captain described the cards, the
method of creating, maintaining and filing them
and the meaning of the numbers on the card. He
testified that the cards were prepared in the usual
course of business. The captain testified that he
knew the card to contain the fingerprints of the
defendant because he had taken the defendant's
fingerprints later and they compared with those on
the card.
Two informations were consolidated for trial.
The defendant was convicted on an earlier count
for the armed robbery of a grocery store, and on
one count of attempted armed robbery of the liquor
store and for assault with a deadly weapon. The
defendant, on appeal, objected that the trial court,
erred in admitting the fingerprint card into evi-
dence.
The defendant made two contentions on the
first objection, first that the card was hearsay and
its admission was not justifiable under any excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. The court disagreed with
this contention, saying that the card was admissible
under the "business record" exception, which
permits the admission of a record of an act if the
custodian of the record or another qualified person
testifies to its identity, its mode of preparation and
that it was made in the regular course of business.
Then, if the trial court judge believes the sources
of the information and the method and time of
preparation are such as to justify admission, he
can eliminate the necessity of calling each witness
to the event.
The court said that it was immaterial, as long
as a proper foundation was laid, that the person
who actually took the defendant's fingerprints
and placed them on the card was not called. The
statute gives wide discretion to the trial court
which will not be lightly disturbed on appeal.
Moreover, the captain's testimony was sufficient
to sustain the trial court's decision.
The card would not be admissible if no indi-
vidual could testify that the prints were those of
the defendant, but dearly the person who did take
them could have testified to this and secondly the
captain testified that he knew the fingerprints were
those of the defendant since he compared them to
prints he himself took later.
Defendant's second contention was that because
the card contained the symbols; "Charge 211
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PC 11530 H&S 12951-21650 CVC.", referring to
past charges it was inadmissible since these could
have no relevancy except to show a disposition to
commit crime. This was rejected by the court when
the prosecution offered to blot these symbols out.
Moreover, the court said, these symbols would be
meaningless to the lay juryman.
Delay Between Arrest And Indictment-People
v. Hryciuk, 224 N.E.2d 250 (IUI. 1967). Defendant,
arrested in 1939, confessed to the crime of rape
and gave a written confession to a murder com-
mitted two years previously. He was not then
indicted for the murder, but was indicted, tried,
and convicted for the rape. In a post-conviction
hearing in 1953, the defendant was granted a new
trial on the rape charge. The following day, he was
indicted for murder. After the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the post-conviction judgement,
freeing the defendant in 1955, he was tried and
convicted of murder, and sentenced to 199 years in
the penitentiary. The defendant appealed from the
judgement of the Circuit Court of Cook County
convicting him of the 1937 murder on the grounds
that he was denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
The single issue on appeal was whether a pre-
indictment delay of fourteen years, as distinguished
from a post-indictment delay, violated the de-
fendant's rights to a speedy trial. A long line of
cases has held that this provision of the constitution
had no application until the commencement of a
formal prosecution. The state argued that pre-
indictment delays are governed only by the proper
statute of limitations. Since there was no such
statute for murder, the state was free to commence
prosecution whenever it chose.
The court, while not rejecting the general valid-
ity of the state's argument, ruled for the defendant
in light of the particular circumstances of the case.
The court held that a deliberate and calculated
delay of fourteen years between arrest and formal
prosecution, when it prejudiced the defendant and
was not due to the exigencies of police investiga-
tion, was a deprivation of the constitutional
guarantees of due process and speedy trial. Ross v.
United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In the present case, the state had gathered no
additional evidence since 1939, so the delay was
not due to police investigation. Most importantly,
the defendant was seriously prejudiced by the
delay. His attempts to disprove the voluntariness
of his confession were seriously affected by the
death of one of the police officers and the time-
worn recollections of the other two officers. His
right to cross-examine witnesses had been almost
totally vitiated by the delay.
Vagrancy Ordinance Held Unconstitutional-
City of Cleveland v. Forrest, 223 N.E.2d 661 (Cleve-
land Mun. Ct. 1967). The accused was charged
with the violation of Codified Ordinance of the
City of Cleveland 13.0935, which provides in
pertinent part:
Whoever... is found wandering about the
streets, either by day or by night, without
being able to give a reasonable and satisfac-
tory account of themselves ... shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $50.00 and im-
prisoned not more than six months.
The evidence indicated that the accused was
standing on a street comer for less than five min-
utes, at which time she boarded a bus. The police
followed the bus for a number of blocks, finally
boarded it, forcibly removed the defendant, and
arrested her.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge. The court held that the above
stated language of the ordinance violates the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
First, the trial court found that the ordinance
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The provision "offends the basic
rights guaranteed by the Constitution", and it is
"too indefinite and restrictive of liberty".
Secondly, the court found that the provision
which required a citizen to "reasonably and satis-
factorily account for his presence on the street"
violated the Fifth Amendment right to silence as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), the court held that it is beyond the
police power of a municipality to compel a citizen
to justify his presence on the public streets.
The court also ruled that this ordinance violates
the rights secured by both clauses of the Fourth
Amendment. First, it infringes upon "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons... against
unreasonable ... seizures". Also, because the arrest
was made without probable cause, it violates the
right that "... no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause. . .". The trial judge emphasized
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that the purpose of this amendment is to place a
shield between the sovereign and the citizens, but
this ordinance provides a means by which they may
be indiscriminately seized.
The court explicitly pointed out that its ruling
was relevant only to the criminal charge of being a
"(suspicious person", and in no way applies to the
police practice of holding a person in custody for
investigation without filing a charge.
Trace Of Heroin Not Sufficient For Narcotics
Conviction-Marshall v. United States, 229 A.2d
449 (D.C.Cir. 1967). After a police raid on an
apartment, defendants along with others were
arrested. 'Defendant Watkins was convicted for
narcotic vagrancy, Marshall was convicted for
maintaining a common nuisance, and both were
also convicted for the possession of narcotics.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reversed the convictions with directions to enter
judgments of acquittal because of the absence of
any proof that defendants possessed more than a
trace of heroin or that such trace could be used or
dispensed as narcotics. Maintaining a common
nuisance requires evidence that persons frequenting
the premises are in fact addicts or that a measurable
quantity of narcotics is found usable or salable.
The same rationale applies to conviction for nar-
cotic vagrancy. There must be evidence of the
presence of a quantity of narcotics sufficient to be
dispensed or used.
The court did not remand the case for a new
trial because there was no showing that the govern-
ment had additional proof as to the amount of
heroin involved.
Indictment Is Incompetent Evidence Because It
Is A Mere Accusation-Montesi v. State, 417
S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1967). The defendant was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter in the shooting
of his wife. He claimed he was innocent and impli-
cated another person (Bersacola) in the killing.
Bersacola was indicted but the grand jury returned
the indictment as a "No True Bill". The defendant
contended that the admission of the testimony of
the criminal court clerk that the grand jury had
taken this action on the indictment of Bersacola
was prejudicial error.
The court accepted this contention, considering
the testimony of the court clerk incompetent for
any purpose. It could not see how the conclusions
of the grand jurors on the indictment of Bersacola
could be relevant in any way to the defendant's
trial. The court reasoned that this evidence should
not have been admitted for the same reasons an
accused cannot be asked about indictments pend-
ing against him on cross-examination. These
reasons are that an indictment is at best only an
accusation and raises no presumption of guilt. It
is hearsay because it is the conclusion of a body of
men based on ex parte evidence. Thus the return
of a no-true bill by a grand jury must be considered
meiely evidence of its conclusion based on the
evidence presented to it.
The admission of this incompetent evidence was
prejudicial error, according to the court, because
the case against the defendant was otherwise
tenuous. Without this evidence there was doubt of
the defendant's guilt since all other evidence
against him was entirely circumstantial and incon-
clusive. The court felt this evidence was especially
used to the defendant's prejudice when the prose-
cutor referred to the defendant's implication of
Bersacola by saying in his closing argument,
Twelve good and true men sitting on the
grand jury didn't buy it, Gentlemen of the
Jury, and I don't believe twelve good men
such as yourselves, Gentlemen of the Jury are
going to buy it.
Thus the judgement of the trial court was reversed.
"Increasingly Meticulous" Care Concept Used
To Hold Confession Inadmissible-Ledbetter v.
Warden, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966). The de-
fendant, a ninteen year old, was sentenced to life
imprisonment for his 1960 conviction of first degree
murder. Following a habeas corpus proceeding
against the Warden of Maryland State Peniten-
tiary, the defendant was ordered released or
retried without the use of incriminating statements
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause.
The defendant was arrested between three and
five p.m. by the Baltimore police for the robbery-
murder of Lawrence North, after he was implicated
by a co-defendant, Jerry Dennis. Ledbetter was
originally held in a small room guarded by Officer
Moser. The officer led the conversation between
them around to the crime and the defendant made
several inculpatory statements. Later, at 8:30 p.m.
six officers formally questioned the defendant and
presented him with the signed confession of Dennis.
By 10:30 p.m. Ledbetter had signed a statement
describing his part in the crime.
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During the first conversation the defendant's
request to phone his family was denied and at no
time was he advised of his right to remain silent,
that statements he might make could be used
against him or that he had a right to counsel.
The circuit court agreed with the district court
that the totality of circumstances made Ledbetter's
confession inadmissable when considered against
the background of his age and education. The
number of hours he was held were not, in the
court's opinion, as important as the obvious inten-
tion of the police to hold the defendant incom-
municado for an unknown period of questioning.
Although persons whose trials were completed
prior to the Miranda and Escobedo decisions may
not invoke their safeguards as a procedural viola-
tion of due process they may be invoked as part of
a substantive involuntariness claim. Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
The Supreme Court in the Johnson case observed
that the substantive test used has "because of the
persistance of abusive practices become increas-
ingly meticulous through the years". 384 U.S. 719,
at 730. The appellate court said that all it and the
district court were doing in the present case was to
apply these "increasingly meticulous" standards
to Ledbetter's case.
The court found that trial counsel's failure to
object to the admission of the oral and written
confession did not constitute such a deliberate by-
passing of state procedures as to cause a forfeiture
of defendant's right to challenge his conviction by
federal habeas corpus. The court reasoned that at
the time of the trial an objection would have been
a futile gesture and therefore was not a deliberate
bypassing. Moreover, the fact that defendant's
counsel did not consult with him before waiver and
the fact that the confession was the only evidence
linking Ledbetter to the crime necessitated a
strong showing of a case of deliberate bypassing
before a habeas corpus petition should be dis-
missed.
Two judges dissented, saying the confession was
in fact not involuntary and the failure of the trial
counsel to object did constitute a waiver.
Comment: While much could be said about the
court's reasons for permitting a habeas corpus
petition even though trial counsel waived any
objection to the admission of the confession, the
important thrust of this opinion is its use of the
"increasingly meticulous" care concept. In the
present case Ledbetter had been held only about
one hour before his oral confession and had signed
the written one within five to six hours, after one
hour of formal questioning.
According to the appellate court the only failings
of the police were not giving the Miranda and
Escobedo warnings and not letting the defendant
call anyone. Both of these were common practices
before the above decisions and absent other im-
portant coercive factors did not usually lead to the
inadmissability of a confession.
By the use of the phrase "increasingly meticu-
lous", the Fourth Circuit thus appears ready to
find a due process violation in certain cases where
police coercion involves little more than failure to
give Miranda warnings.
Defendants Placed In Double Jeopardy When
Dismissed Charges Are Reinstated During Trial-
People v. Gallas, 221 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. 1966).
Defendants were indicted on four counts of theft
which charged them with unauthorized control
over four television sets. At the close of the People's
case, defendants moved for a directed finding of not
guilty on all counts. The court allowed the motions
as to the first count and entered a memorandum
order to that effect, although it adjourned for the
day before submitting the order to the jury. When
court convened the following day, the court entered
another memorandum order rescinding the order of
the previous day, and the prosecuting attorney
declined to prosecute further on the 2nd, 3rd, and
4th counts of the indictment. Defendants were
then convicted on the first count.
On appeal, defendants contended that the order
rescinding the order of not guilty as to count one
violated their constitutional rights against double
jeopardy. The position of the State as to this issue
was that the order of not guilty (a) "was not a valid
order in that the jury was not instructed on the
finding of not guilty" and (b) "did not result in
double jeopardy in that the jeopardy took place in
the same trial as the conviction sought to be set
aside".
The appellate court rejected both of the State's
contentions and reversed the judgment of the trial
court. As to the first contention, the appellate
court held that "the court had the authority to
dismiss the charges contained in count one without
the submission of a jury instruction". The instruc-
tion, in the view of the appellate court, would have
been only a "formality" following the determina-
tion by the trial judge of the question of law
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brought before him by defendants' motion. The
court likewise rejected the State's second conten-
tion stating "that a defendant, who has been placed
in jeopardy and who has charges dismissed by the
trial court, cannot have the charges reinstated
either before or after the jury has been discharged".
Blood Tests And Drunken Driving-State v.
Lafountain, 231 A.2d 635 (N.H., 1967). Defendant
was convicted for driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. Evidence of a blood test was
admitted. There was a possibility that alcohol
may have been used to prepare the skin surface
for a puncturing needle. The court recognized that
the use of alcohol was not a recommended proce-
dure, and would affect the reliability of the test,
but concluded that this would affect only the
weight and credibility of the test and not its
admissibility. Evidence does not have to be in-
fallible to be admissible, and the deficiencies or
weaknesses relating to the method and manner of
the blood test are a matter of defense which affect
the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.
The dissent claimed that the state has the burden
of laying a proper foundation for the admission of
the evidence by showing that the test was properly
administered and showing the reliability of the
sample. The majority, by eliminating the require-
ment that the doctor testify as to the conditions
under which the test was taken, has shifted the
burden to the defendant to show contamination
of the test by affirmative evidence. The dissent
concluded that there was no evidence of the relia-
bility of the test.
Right Of Defendant Accused Of Rape To Cross-
Examine Physician-State v. Tins, 224 N.E.2d 348
(Ohio 1967). The defendant appealed from the
order of the court of appeals affirming his convic-
tion for statutory rape. He claimed that the admis-
sion of the physician's report of the examination
for rape upon the testimony of the hospital's clerk
of records, rather than that of the physician,
denied him the constitutional right to cross-ex-
amine all witnesses.
The Business Records as Evidence Act, Ohio
Revised Code § 2317.40, a statutory liberalization
of the shop-book rule, permits the admission of
records without the necessity of calling all witnesses
who have collaborated in the report. § 2945.1 states
that all rules of civil evidence, where applicable,
govern in criminal cases. The central issue, there-
fore, was whether the constitutional right of a
defendant to cross-examine witnesses prevented
application of the Business Records as Evidence
Act.
In this instance, where the report of the rape
examination substantiated the essential elements
of the state's case, the court ruled that the de-
fendant was denied his right to cross-examine his
accusers.
Constitutional Uses Of Scientific Voice Tests-
State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384 (N.J. 1967). Defendant
appealed from a pre-trial order of the court which
granted a motion by the state compelling the
defendant to record his voice. The state intended
to make a scientific comparison of this tape with
the tape they had made of a call to the station
house which concerned the murder for which the
defendant was on trial.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
person's voice was a physical characteristic like a
fingerprint and therefore not protected by the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The defendant conceded that his Fifth Amendment
rights were not violated, but argued that a compul-
sory voice test forcing him to record his voice
against his will was a violation of due process.
The court said that the product of a search must
be capable of admission into evidence so as not to
violate defendant's right to privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Since there were few
decisions which decided the reliability of such
tests, the court remanded the case for a determina-
tion by the lower court of the scientific accuracy of
these tests.
Conceding the reliability of the evidence for the
sake of argument, the court then considered the
defendant's contention that the admission of such
evidence would deprive him of due process.
Relying on the doctrine of Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165(1952), the defendant argued that
methods used by the state to compel him to record
his voice would 'shock the conscience'. The court
suggested two ways to compel defendant to co-
operate without violating his constitutional
rights. Although there were no usual procedures to
obtain voice samples from a resisting person such
as those used by a physician to obtain blood sam-
ples from a resisting patient, the court said that
the usual sanction of contempt might compel the
defendant to co-operate. Even more effectively,
they stated, his refusal to submit could be the
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subject of comment by the prosecutor or the trial
judge to show consciousness of guilt and incon-
sistency with a claim of innocence. The court
justified this method on the grounds that Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609(1965) forbids comments
by the prosecutor only in cases where the defendant
is protected by a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. In this situation since the defendant had no
constitutional right to refuse, the prosecutor's
comments about his refusal to submit to a voice
test would not violate the Griffin rule.
Phone Taps And The Hearsay Rule--People v.
Wells, 224 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. App. 1967). Defendant
was charged with and convicted of disorderly
conduct for making late evening telephone calls to
one Whitnel. After receiving several annoying
telephone calls, the complainant, Whitnel, had a
monitoring device placed on his phone with the
authorization of the local police department. The
calls of June ninth and tenth were traced to the
defendant.
The defendant objected to the telephone
supervisor's testimony about the tracing operation
on the grounds that it was hearsay and there was
no reason why the technician who performed the
actual tracing could not be present to be examined.
The supervisor testified that he had gone through
each stage of the operation with the technician,
but that the technician had made the actual
determination of the exchange that had made the
call. The court ruled that the manager's testimony
was admissible since it was within a well recognized
exception to the hearsay rule. Since the manager
as a reasonably qualified witness offered testimony
about an ordinarily reliable operation, the testi-
mony was sufficient to establish circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness. The defendant was
protected since the jury was able to test the weight
of the evidence.
Telephone Tracing Device Use Upheld-State
v. Coleman, 154 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1967). The
defendant was convicted of willfully using lewd
and profane language over the telephone. Prior to
the present offense there had been a rash of
obscene calls in answer to newspaper ads which,
by their content, indicated a female would answer
the telephone. The police, in an attempt to ap-
prehend the caller, ran the ad: "EMBA MINK
JACKET CAPE STOLE, slightly used. Will sell
at a sacrifice. Nice gift. 334-3237". A policewoman
took incoming calls in the police station. There was
no jacket for sale.
Attached to phone in the ad was a "diode"
device which allows both the calling and receiving
party to hold the connection by leaving the
respective receiver off the hook. The device is
installed in the telephone exchange to serve a
particular phone. When the receiving party gets a
call he wishes traced he calls the telephone com-
pany and it may then trace it by following the still
open circuit back to its source. Without such a
device the receiving party cannot maintain the
connection once the calling party hangs up. A
person may make an obscene call, hang up quickly,
and be assured of anonymity.
T. G. Latham, a telephone company employee,
installed the "diode" and traced the call to Cole-
man's address. Policemen came to the scene,
entered the house and arrested the defendant.
Officer Treadaway testified that he lifted the
receiver of the defendant's telephone and spoke to
the policewoman without dialing.
The defendant's counsel argued that the state
had failed to establish Mr. Latham as an expert in
the installation and operation of the "diode"
before he testified to its accuracy and reliability.
The court dismissed this by saying that Officer
Treadaway's testimony showed the device to be
operating correctly. The fact that the connection
between the defendant's phone and the police
station was still open and a conversation could be
carried on without dialing was proof enough of the
reliability of the device.
In response to the defendant's claim of entrap-
ment, the court observed a clear distinction be-
tween inducing a person to commit a crime he did
not contemplate doing and setting a trap to catch
him in execution of a crime of his own conception.
Footprints Given Probative Value In Burglary
Conviction-State v. McGlathery, 412 S.W.2d 445
(Mo. 1967). Defendant was convicted of burglary
in the second degree and sentenced to ten years.
The evidence relied on by the trial court was
entirely circumstantial. Defendant contended on
appeal that this evidence was insufficient to
support a jury verdict against him.
Bystanders saw defendant get out of a car and
walk toward the store which was later broken into.
A state trooper, notified by one of the eyewitnesses,
pursued defendant after he had left the store.
Defendant's clothing matched the bystanders'
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description of the man who walked from the car to
the store. The trooper noticed that the defendant
was wearing "Nunn-Bush" shoes which were
muddy. Footprints found leading to and from the
store and near the parked car were "identical
in comparison." The brand name, "Nunn-Bush",
as well as a design, both printed on the heel,
matched the footprints in the mud.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the
conviction, holding that the totality of the cir-
cumstantial evidence necessarily and obviously
pointed to the defendant's guilt. The evidence of
the defendant's footprints at the store was a
sufficient basis upon which to support a verdict of
guilt. The size, heel markings and the mud on the
defendant's shoes could support a finding that the
defendant's shoes matched the footprints even
though the make, "Nunn-Bush", was a common
make shoe. The court noted, however, that it
would not give probative value to a matching of
just size or heel markings without more evidence
concerning the footprints.
Radar Used To Test Speedometer Must Be
Proved Accurate-State v. Lane, 232 A.2d 518
(Conn. App. Div. 1967). On February 3, 1966 the
defendant was clocked for one-half mile by a state
trooper and found to be driving seventy to seventy-
four miles an hour. The speed limit on this high-
way, while in dispute, was apparently sixty miles
per hour. The trooper, the state's only witness,
testified to the defendant's speed while being
clocked, then testified that his speedometer had
been checked by radar on January 20, 1966 by
driving the patrol car through a radar beam at
speeds of 40, 60, and 80 miles per hour. The
defendant objected to this testimony, claiming it
to be hearsay since no proper foundation had been
laid. The defendant was overruled and took
exception. The witness, in order to refresh his
recollection, then referred to a calibration sheet,
that had been prepared by the radar operator and
which gave the results of the tests. The officer did
not know if the radar was operating correctly nor
did he have any personal knowledge of the validity
of the recordings. Once again the defendant ob-
jected and was overruled. He appealed.
The appellate court held that the radar operator
should have been required to testify as to the
results of the calibration test after a foundation
had been laid by demonstrating satisfactorily that
the radar itself was functioning properly. While the
evidence of the speed of Lane's car, as indicated
by the officer's speedometer, established a prima
facie case of a violation of the statute, the court
said that defendant's testimony that his speedom-
eter indicated a speed of fifty-five to sixty miles
per hour required the state to show the accuracy
of the trooper's speedometer, and, necessarily, the
accuracy of the method of testing that speedom-
eter. The court, therefore, reversed and ordered a
new trial.
Chain Of Custody Adequately Proven Even
Though Vials Mixed-Barquera v. California,
374 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1967). Defendant was
convicted on two counts for the sale of heroin and
one count for conspiracy to sell heroin. His peti-
tion for habeas corpus was denied by the United
States District Court, and the defendant appealed.
Defendant contended that the heroin sold to him
by an agent should not have been admitted as
evidence because of a supposed mix-up by the
police subsequent to their seizure of the evidence.
The narcotics were taken by the police, removed
from the balloons in which they were delivered to
the defendant and placed in vials. After testing, the
contents of the vials were placed in envelopes. The
contents from two of the vials were placed in one
envelope, and the other envelope was empty.
The court held that the chain of possession by the
police from the balloons to the envelopes was
satisfactorily proved. The court also concluded that
the state did not have the burdex of proving that
the police did not have an opportunity to tamper
with the evidence.
Failure Of Government To Produce FBI
Report Held Reversible Error-United States
v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967). The de-
fendant was convicted of kidnaping, and he
appealed. His appeal was based on the govern-
ment's failure to produce an FBI report of the
victim's physical examination. The appeal was
successful, and a new trial ordered.
The facts showed that the defendant had as-
sisted the victim's date in getting his car started.
The defendant then asked for and received a ride
to a certain destination which necessitated crossing
from Illinois to Missouri. Upon arrival at the
destination, the defendant forced the driver from
the car and kept the girl with him as he drove back
to Illinois. The girl testified that during this trip
CASE NOTES
she was forced to have sexual intercourse with the
defendant for fear of being harmed.
The defendant contended that the government
failed to disclose a report favorable to him. This
report concerned a physical examination of the
girl by a doctor. The doctor's name and the report
were not given to the defense counsel.
The defense theory was that the girl was a
willing companion of the defendant. Certain facts
on cross examination showed that the victim's
behavior was not consistent with one who was
being held against her will. The doctor's report
would establish whether or not the act of sexual
intercourse had taken place, and therefore bear
materially on the girl's credibility. The defense
argued that withholding of this report constituted
reversible error.
The appellate court thought that a showing by
the defendant of prejudice resulting from the
failure to disclose the medical report would be
difficult. The failure to disclose nevertheless
tended to deny the defendant a fundamentally fair
trial. This conclusion followed from the fact that
if the report had been disclosed,
It could have led to calling the doctor to
testify, and perhaps to calling the FBI agent in
rebuttal. In any event, the report bore
materially on the important issue of the girl's
credibility. If the jury found a reasonable
doubt of intercourse, it may have rejected all
of the girl's testimony and found a reasonable
doubt about the forced abduction....
Under the court's supervisory power, the con-
viction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Standing To Object To Illegally Obtained
Evidence--United States v. Maiwisi, 379 F.2d
897 (2nd Cir., 1967). The defendant and two
others, all officers of a union local, were indicted
for conspiracy, coercion, and extortion in con-
nection with an illegal monopolization of the
juke box industry. They were charged with ex-
tracting tribute in the form of fees, dues, and
assessments. When these men refused to surrender
their books and records, state officials seized them
over the protests of the defendant. The seizure was
conducted without a search warrant and was
illegal. The books and records seized were intro-
duced into evidence.
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a
term of from three to five years. Following his
conviction, the defendant appealed alleging that
the search and seizure was illegal and therefore the
evidence should not have been admitted. His
appeals failed on the ground that he lacked stand-
ing to raise this issue because the evidence seized
was the property of the union and not his own
personal property.
The defendant, after exhausting his state
remedies, applied for a federal writ of habeas
corpus. The federal court concluded that the
defendant had standing to challenge the illegally
seized evidence, and voided defendant's conviction.
The court recognized the old rule of standing
which required that the defendant must "claim
either to have owned or possessed the seized
property or to have a substantial possessory
interest in the premises searched". Liberalization
of the "standing" rule has caused courts to look
more at whom the illegal search was directed
rather than who was the owner of the illegally
seized property. Therefore, the court only re-
quired proof that the person challenging the
illegally seized evidence was the person whose
privacy was invaded. A person's privacy can be
invaded by unreasonable searches and seizures at
his place of business as well as his home. "The
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a
constitutional right to go about his business free
from unreasonable official entries upon his private
commercial property."
Waiver Of Right To Object To Illegally Ob-
tained Evidence-Henry v. State, 198 So.2d 213
(Miss. 1967). The defendant, Aaron Henry, was
convicted of disturbing the peace. His conviction
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi
upon the record made in county court. The
testimony in question came from an officer who
searched the defendant's car with defendant's
wife's consent. Procedural rules required the
defendant to object to the illegally obtained
testimony when offered into evidence. The de-
fendant's attorneys failed to make proper objec-
tion, though they moved for a directed verdict on
the evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court
excused the irregularities believing that Henry was
represented by out-of-state lawyers, and remanded
for a new trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court, on
rehearing, affirmed the conviction when it learned
that Henry had been represented by local counsel.
The case then went to the Supreme Court
which held: ".. . that the purpose of the con-
temporaneous-objection rule may have been
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substantially served by petitioner's motion at the
close of the state's evidence asking for a directed
verdict because of the erroneous admission of the
officer's testimony". Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443,448 (1965). The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court on the
issue of whether or not Henry had waived his
constitutional claim of illegally obtained evidence.
On remand the Mississippi Supreme Court
established a new rule of procedure similar to the
federal rule. Under this rule, the defendant was
permitted to petition to strike the illegally ob-
tained evidence before trial, or to object to it when
introduced. The case was remanded to the trial
court to determine whether under this rule the
defendant intentionally waived his right to object
to the illegal search. Henry v. State, 174 So.2d 348
(1965).
The trial court ruled the defendant did not
waive his objection to the evidence. The state
thereafter appealed to the Mississippi Supreme
Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the State met the burden of prov-
ing that defendant's counsel deliberately waived
objection to the evidence as a strategic move. In
summary, when the illegal evidence was offered
during the original trial, there was no objection,
and, as already stated, counsel for defendant did
not give the trial court an opportunity to rule out
the evidence. [198 So.2d 213, 218 (1967).]
Searches And Seizures In Obscenity Cases-
Flack v. Municipal Court, 429 P.2d 192 (Cal.
1967); United States v. Reliable Sales Company,
376 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1967). In Flack the defend-
ants, a theatre owner and his employees, were
charged with violation of the state's criminal
obscenity statute. They moved to suppress the
allegedly obscene film seized incident to their
arrest. This motion was denied by the superior
court, but the supreme court reversed and granted
defendants' motion.
The defendants contended that the seizure of the
film violated their right to free speech guaranteed
by the First Amendment and their right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment, since the seizure
occurred in the absence of a search warrant and
without prior judicial determination of the issue
of obscenity. The supreme court agreed.
Noting that obscenity is not speech constitu-
tionally protected by the First Amendment, the
court upheld the state's right to regulate and
suppress obscenity through its police powers.
However, the court emphasized that under the
Fourteenth Amendment a state is not free to
adapt whatever procedures it desires, without
regard to the possible consequences for constitu-
tionally protected speech. Marcus v. Search
Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Thus, while it is
settled that in the ordinary case a seizure of
evidence incident to an arrest is not unreasonable,
the First Amendment requires stricter rules in this
area when the arrest and seizure relate to alleged
obscenity. Here the court held that with the
exception of a situation involving a legitimate
emergency, even if the search is contemporaneous
with an arrest, a search warrant must be secured
prior to any search or seizure of material alleged
to be obscene. The court pointed out that the film
in question had been shown nightly for two weeks
preceding the officers' action. Therefore, there was
no reason to rely on the officers' unfettered discre-
tion where there was ample time to obtain a
warrant with the attendant judicial determination
of the issue of obscenity. The court emphasized that
Within the precinct of the First Amendment
only the requirement that a search warrant be
obtained prior to any search or seizure assures
a free society that the sensitive determination
of obscenity will be made judicially and not
ad hoc by police officers in the field.
In Reliable Sales, two shipments of nudist
magazines were seized upon entry at the port of
Baltimore. Customs officers initiated a forfeiture
proceeding alleging the publications were obscene.
The district judge found that three issues were
obscene and eleven issues were not. He ordered the
obscene issues to be forfeited and directed the
non-obscene issues to be immediately released.
The government filed a petition to stay the release
order pending appeal. The district court did stay
the order until appeal, but stated that henceforth
in ordinary cases it would release the bulk of the
material found not obscene, but a provision would
be made to hold a sample of the material until the
case was decided on appeal. The Fourth Circuit
approved and held that although a small sample
may be retained for purposes of appeal, the bulk of
publications which a district court judge has ruled
are not obscene, must be released immediately upon
this determination.
The court of appeals emphasized that the
determinative factor concerning validity of
censorship procedures is whether or not adequate
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safeguards are provided to insure prompt dis-
semination of publications which have not been
judicially determined to be obscene. The court
pointed out that these publications not only were
not judicially determined to be obscene but, to the
contrary, were found to be not obscene. Also, the
court stated that it was not concerned with the
danger that if the trial judge errs, obscene material
will flood the country, because it must still "face
the gauntlet" of universal state obscenity laws.
One judge strongly dissented. He felt that there
was no compelling reason that necessitated the
immediate release of such literature, subjecting
the country to the dangers of obscene material
before there has been a complete determination of
this issue.
State Court Treatment Of Obscenity-People
v. Biocic, 224 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. App. 1967); Felton
v. City of Pensacola, 200 So.2d 842 (Fla. App. 1967);
Donnenberg v. State, 232 A.2d 264 (Md. App. 1967);
State v. Henry, 198 So.2d 889 (La. 1967). In Biocic
the defendant was charged with selling two nudist
magazines to a policeman. Both indictments were
dismissed when the trial judge found as a matter
of law that the magazines were not obscene, and so
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.
Upon the People's appeal the appellate court
affirmed, holding that nudity without lewdness is
not obscene.
The magazines in Biocic contained color and
black and white pictures of nude persons, including
some photographs showing private parts of the
body completely exposed and even accentuated.
Also, they contained articles that described and
glorified the principles and philosophy of nudist
living. Throughout the publication were reproduc-
tions of works of classical art portraying nudes.
These magazines were displayed on a book rack
with other "girlie-type" magazines.
The People first contended that the trial judge
erred in ruling that the magazines were not obscene
as a matter of law. The appellate court, applying
the test of obscenity introduced in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), found that according
to contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
would not appeal to the prurient interest of the
average person. The court found that no attempt
was made to portray sex in a seductive or shameful
manner. Further, because each magazine was
dedicated to expounding through articles the
social theory that nudism has a place in our culture,
the magazines were not totally devoid of socially
redeeming characteristics.
Also, the People urged that even if the magazines
were not obscene per se, the defendant demon-
strated an obscene purpose by selling them as
evidenced by the fact that he also sold many other
"girlie-type" magazines. Citing Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) as authority, the
People contended that such purpose rendered the
accused guilty of the crime of obscenity. The
appellate court rejected this argument. First,
quoting the trial judge, it held that "obscenity is
not a literary contagion which one book gets from
another". Therefore if the defendant did sell other
material dealing with sex, that fact could not make
these magazines obscene. The court also dis-
tinguished Ginzburg, holding that here the indict-
ments charged the defendant with selling obscene
material and not with having held out the maga-
zines as obscene. Since the prosecution proceeded
on the theory that the material was obscene per se,
the defendant could not be convicted of obscenity
for his manner of offering the material for sale.
In Felton the defendant was convicted of
violating a city obscenity ordinance. The conviction
was affirmed by the circuit court and by the
Florida Court of Appeals. Once again, the offen-
sive publications were nudist magazines, filled with
unretouched photographs of men, women and
children, usually at a beach or swimming pool.
But here the court held that the particular
magazines were obscene. The court admitted that
nudity alone was not obscenity but stated that
this does not mean that nudity cannot become
obscene by its method of presentation. The court
applying the Roth test found that in these maga-
zines the "dominant theme taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest". The court noted
that the same persons appear again and again in
the photographs, indicating that these are posed
pictures of professional models. Furthermore, the
pictures are posed in a manner to stress those
portions of the body that are not normally re-
vealed. Also, the court found little redeeming social
value in these publications. There was very little
textual material in the magazines describing the
activities of nudist groups. From these observations
the court concluded that these magazines were not
valid publications of the nudist movement but
rather designed to appeal to the prurient interest of
the public generally. The court also cited Ginz-
burg, finding here an example of the sordid business
of pandering that was controlling in that case.
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The court determined that as in Ginzburg the
purveyor of these magazines' sole emphasis was on
the sexually provocative aspects of his publications.
In Donnenberg, the defendants were convicted
of violating the Maryland obscenity statute for the
sale of several different magazines. On appeal
they contended that the publications were speech
protected by the First Amendment and did not
fall under the test of obscenity enunciated in
Roth. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the
convictions based on some of the magazines which
it found obscene per se, and reversed convictions
based on other magazines, remanding for a new
trial to allow the state the opportunity to present
expert testimony on the question of obscenity.
The court held that there are two classes of
obscenity. The first is hard-core pornography,
material which "focuses predominately upon
what is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and
bizarre without any artistic or scientific purpose or
justification". This type of material so obviously
appeals to the prurient interest that the court
following the Roth test may categorize it as
obscene by merely viewing it. Here the court
found that Degraded In Bondage, a magazine
containing sixty pictures of naked women in
torturous poses highlighting the private areas of
the body was such hard core pornography. It was
also deemed important that this publication
contained no textual material to demonstrate
redeeming social value.
The court next considered nudist magazines
which depicted men and women totally naked with
the private parts of the body exposed, although in
natural and not suggestive positions. There was
also some textual material treating in a "psuedo-
intellectual" manner examples of nudity in art and
literature. The court held that these magazines
were not obviously obscene as were those described
above. The court found that there was "no direct
evidence that all the significant elements of the
Roth test had been met". Also, it did not find in the
record sufficient evidence to apply the principles
announced in Ginzburg. The court could not
determine "that the purveyor's sole emphasis was
on the sexually provocative aspects of his publica-
tions". Therefore, the court reversed the con-
victions based on these nudist magazines. But it
remanded the cases to the trial court to allow the
state to present expert testimony and other proper
evidence on the issue of obscenity.
In Henry the defendant was convicted under the
Louisiana obscenity statute of having possessed,
exhibited and sold obscene books, magazines,
pictures and drawings. On appeal the defendant
urged, inter alia, that evidence of a local bank
president and a Roman Catholic priest, concerning
the appeal of this material to the prurient interest
of the average person in the community where it
was sold, was error, because such witnesses were
not qualified to express such opinions. Also, the
defendant claimed that the trial court erred in
determining "contemporary community stand-
ards" on a purely local rather than nationwide
basis. And the defendant urged that the court erred
in excluding evidence relating to certain books
exhibited in the local public library and to certain
motion pictures shown in local theatres which the
defendant desired to use to establish "con-
temporary community standards". The supreme
court rejected these claims of error and affirmed
the conviction.
The court first noted that even if the above
claims were reversible error, they would not be
controlling because throughout the trial the
defendant based his defense upon the theory that
he had not examined the materials, and since he
did not know their content could not have possessed
the specific intent necessary for conviction. Be-
cause the accused failed to attempt to defend the
magazines' content, the supreme court held it
could not reverse the trial court's judgment that
the magazines were obscene. But the court dealt
with the defendant's claims of error on the merits.
Regarding the first claim, the court held that the
testimony would be admissible in any case, because
the witnesses' qualifications would relate to the
weight that should be given their testimony
rather than to its admissibility. Furthermore, the
court stated that it would have been difficult to
find other witnesses as well qualified to express an
opinion as to the effect on the average person in the
community because
From his early years until the time of trial he
[the bank president] had been engaged for a
livelihood in occupations involving extensive
public contact and had served actively in
numerous organizations which dealt with civic,
social and religious affairs of the community.
The court reaches the same conclusion concerning
the priest's qualifications to testify.
Concerning the national vs. local community
standards issue, the court first noted that there
was no constitutional requirement that a national
19681
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test be applied. It also found that the fact that the
material was judged by a local standard did not
mean that the material was not also of such a
nature to offend a standard based on the mores of
the average person considered from a national
viewpoint "as might be conceived by the United
States Supreme Court in its nationwide wisdom".
Since the material was not a part of the record, the
court could not make a determination but ac-
cepted the finding of obscenity proposed by the
trial court.
The court also found that the trial judge was
correct, in excluding as irrelevant, evidence relating
to other books and motion pictures in the com-
munity. The court reasoned that if such evidence
were allowed, too great a burden would be placed on
the trial court. It would be necessary to determine
if these other materials were obscene because it
would be no defense for the violation of a statute
to suggest that the statute is being violated by
others.
Comment: The Supreme Court in two cases
decided this term seems to have confirmed the
view that nudist magazines, if not lewd, fall within
speech protected by the First Amendment. In
Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S.
50(1967), the Court in a per curiam decision re-
versed the Fourth Circuit's determination that
certain Danish magazines were obscene and should
be denied customs clearance. The court of appeals
described these publications as featuring photo-
graphs of nude males and females in lewd positions
with private parts flagrantly exposed. In another
per curiam decision, Conner v. City of Hammond,
389 U.S. 48(1967), the Court upheld the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruling that certain nudist maga-
zines were not obscene, but also held the state
court in error in its determination that certain
"girlie-type" magazines were obscene.
Thus, while the state and lower federal courts are
still entitled to make their own determination as to
obscenity, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to
reverse and find that the material does fall within
apparently widening categories of constitutionally
protected speech.
Gault To Be Applied Retroactively-Applica-
lion of Billie, 429 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
Petitioners, who were minors, were committed to
the state industrial school and petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals of
Airzona granted the writ.
At the commitment hearing, neither the peti-
tioners nor their parents were advised of their
right to counsel. In the case of In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that juveniles have the right to
counsel in delinquency cases and must be informed
of this right. The only remaining question in
Billie was whether that rule should apply to one
committed before the decision in Gault. The
Arizona court held that, since Gault also involved a
habeas corpus proceeding, it necessarily applied to
those who raised the question in the same way,
regardless of analogous law on the retroactivity of
judicial decisions.
Motion To Supress Held Applicable To Juvenile
With Fourth Amendment Claim-State v. Lowry,
230 A.2d 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). Two adult
defendants and one juvenile defendant, charged
with unlawful possession of marijuana, brought a
motion to the New Jersey Superior Court to
suppress evidence which they claimed to be the
product of an unreasonable search and seizure by
state police. jurisdiction of the court to decide the
Fourth Amendment question was based upon a
New Jersey statute which provided, in part:
... a person claiming to be aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure and having reason-
able grounds to believe that the evidence ob-
tained may be used against him in a proceed-
ing, may apply only to the Superior Court or
County Court for the county in which the
evidence was obtained for the return of prop-
erty seized and to suppress the evidence ob-
tained, even though the offense charged or to
be charged may be within the jurisdiction of
the municipal court.
The court ruled the motion properly before it,
but held that the search was reasonable since it
was based on probable cause, and thus the motion
to suppress was denied.
The court's opinion was mainly concerned with
the right of the juvenile defendant to move for the
suppression of the evidence based on a Fourth
Amendment right. Juvenile courts have not always,
in the past, provided for the same constitutional
standards as in a court of criminal law; rather, the
standards used are fundamental fairness and due
process. The divergence of the juvenile courts was
justified because the proceedings were considered
civil in nature with the government acting as
guardian of parens patriae rather than accuser.
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Also, criminal procedure was not applicable
because it was felt that the procedure was too
harsh for juveniles.
The court noted that the Fourth Amendment
was basic to fundamental fairness and due process
required of the juvenile courts, and thus it applied
to juveniles also. As mentioned in the opinion, the
trend recently has been to apply constitutional
directives to juvenile courts.
The court also held that the juvenile who wishes
to move for the suppression of evidence should, like
adults, apply to the superior courts in accordance
with the statute quoted above. Yet, the court had
difficulty in reaching this conclusion. The criminal
practice rules state that the enunciated procedure
is not applicable to juvenile courts. "This implies,"
the opinion stated, "that a minor within the juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court may not utilize any
of the rules of criminal procedure, at the hearing or
prehearing stage." Nonetheless, the juvenile in
this case was charged with an act, which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would be considered criminal.
Thus, the juvenile would be subject to a "penal
proceeding" provided for in the statute and should
be entitled to its coverage.
Another problem the court encountered was
that the statute seemed to apply to cases in
municipal courts only, which would have excluded
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The statute
was interpreted, however, to apply to all courts
dealing with penal behavior rather than just the
municipal courts. Moreover, the court noted that
the recent trend in cases dealing with juveniles is to
give them more constitutional rights "thereby
necessitating utilization of the criminal rules of
procedure".
Comment: The constitutional rights of juveniles
were further expanded by the United States
Supreme Court in In the Matter of Gaidt, 87 S.Ct.
1428 (1967), decided a week after the Lowry
decision. The right to counsel, to confrontation and
cross-examination, to a transcript of the proceed-
ings, to appellate review, to notice of the charges,
and the privilege against self-incrimination were all
held applicable to juveniles. The Court noted that
the essentials of fair treatment, rather than con-
formity to criminal procedure, is the standard by
which to evaluate the need for constitutional
directives in the juvenile courts. Lowry appears to
be consistent with the Gault opinion in its concern
for the realistic application of the Constitution to
minors.
Widespread Unbiased Publicity Not Grounds
For Change Of Venue-State v. Beckus, 229
A.2d 316 (Me. 1967). Defendant was indicted and
found guilty of murder under the felony murder
doctrine. The sole basis for appeal was the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion for a change of
venue requested because it was alleged that
publicity had made a fair and impartial jury trial,
as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, impossible.
The murder occurred in connection with an
armed bank robbery in which defendant took part
and in which the victim was a Maine state trooper.
Pretrial publicity by newspaper, radio, and tele-
vision was considerable and completely covered
the county where trial was eventually held. Certain
newspaper accounts of the incident had headlines
such as. "Robbery, Murder Suspect Is Held For
Grand Jury" and "Handcuffed Prisoner, Wayne
E. Beckus, is shown being hustled into the South
Berwick lockup.., following his capture". There
was also a widely publicised fund raising campaign
for the trooper's family under the chairmanship of
the governor of Maine. Before trial twelve regular
and two alternate jurors were chosen from ninety-
two prospective jurors examined. Of the fourteen
selected, all had read newspaper reports of the
attempted robbery, killing and subsequent capture
of defendant, and two had contributed to the
trooper's fund.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the
verdict, ruling that the motion for change of
venue had been properly denied below. In terms
similar to those used by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966), the court framed the determinative
question as: "Did this publicity and fund-raising
before trial establish a reasonable likelihood that a
fair and impartial trial in York County would
thereby be prevented?" (Emphasis added.) In
answering "No" to this question the court relied
upon the following factors: The pretrial publicity
made no mention of actual or purported confes-
sions; there were no requests or demands for action
by the authorities; the trial was conducted in an
orderly and calm manner; the newspaper references
were to the alleged murder, attempted holdup and
the like with nothing in the reports to arouse bias or
prejudice against defendant. The fact that ninety-
two prospective jurors had to be examined did not
convince the court that a "state of mind" existed.
in the county in which a fair jury could not be
obtained, and no abuse of the lower court's discre-
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tion to change venue was shown. The court con-
cluded that "An accused cannot insist that the
county in which the alleged crime occurred shall
have been insulated from publicity. If the publicity
is not of a nature creating bias and prejudice, there
can be no objection that it is widespread."
Miranda Warnings Not Necessary-State v.
Hymore, 224 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio 1967). The de-
fendant, a police officer, was convicted of first
degree manslaughter for the fatal shooting of a
tavern patron. The court of appeals reversed on two
grounds, inter alia, of claimed error: first, the
admission into evidence, over objection, of the
testimony of a deputy sheriff concerning in-
criminating statements made by the defendant at
the scene of the crime before he was given the
required warning of his constitutional rights; and
secondly, the admission of the coroner's testimony
pertaining to incriminating statements given by
the accused on the trip from the scene of the crime
to the jail. The Supreme Court of Ohio then
reversed the appellate court and held that there
was not error on these two grounds, but it re-
manded for further consideration of other assign-
ments of error.
The accused had entered the tavern where the
homicide occurred, ostensibly on duty, as he was
wearing his police uniform. By his own admission
he consumed six to eight drinks. An argument
ensued between the defendant and a patron he was
attempting to arrest on charges of gambling. An-
other patron, Henry Cadena, entered the dispute
and, according to the accused's testimony, hit the
defendant officer. The accused then shot him
dead. The defendant asked someone to call the
sheriff. When the deputy sheriff arrived, he rou-
tinely asked the accused what happened. At this
time the defendant stated, "I shot him". Later,
while he was being transported to the jail, the
accused in a conversation with the coroner, made
several incriminating statements which were
admitted into evidence. The record showed that
this was merely a conversation and not an inter-
rogation. In fact, the defendant did most of the
talking.
The supreme court did not find reversible error
in either of the defendant's claims. The court
found that since the defendant never requested an
attorney, the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), that such a request must be honored,
did not apply. Secondly, the court held that
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) did not
control. After pointing out that the trial of the
present case took place before Miranda was
decided, the court relied on Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966) which specifically held that
Miranda is not required to be applied retroactively.
In an extensive dictum, the court also stated that
even if Johnson was not controlling, the Miranda
decision would not apply to the case at bar. In
relation to the defendant's first claim of error, the
court stated that it would not require officers of the
law to greet each other with warnings of constitu-
tional safeguards whenever they meet at the scene
of a disturbance, unless adequate grounds for such
precautions exist. The court emphasized that the
verbal exchange in this case occurred at the very
outset of a general inquiry and was not comparable
to an in-custody interrogation.
Secondly, regarding the accused's remarks to the
coroner, the court stated that they would be
admissible, although there was no indication in the
record of whether or not the defendant had then
been advised of his constitutional rights. The
court emphasized the voluntary nature of the
conversation.
In contrast to the contentions now made,
the record undisputably supports the view that
the conversation between the defendant and
the coroner was in fact made voluntarily under
conditions which did not create any feeling
that the defendant was compelled to speak on
pain of suffering physical or psychological
mistreatment.
The court then explained that the case was not
controlled by Miranda, because it lacked an
essential element of that case-an in-custody
interrogation.
Comment: There is no doubt that this case was
properly disposed of in view of the ruling in
Johnson that Miranda is not to be applied retroac-
tively. But if the same facts were to arise today,
the evidence might be suppressed in light of the
Miranda requirements.
The court's holding that police officers are not
ordinarily required to greet each other with warn-
ings of constitutional rights, is reasonable and
would not be grounds for reversal.
But it is not so certain that the defendant's
conversation with the coroner would also stand. It
can be forcibly argued that transportation in a
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police car to the police station while under arrest
would constitute a custodial situation. While the
talk with the coroner was not an interrogation in
the ordinary sense, it is still a conversation with
an officer of the state while riding in a police
vehicle enroute to the station. Certainly the
accused was in the "custody" of the officers at the
time. Ib Miranda the majority discussed at great
length the ploys that have been used to induce a
suspect to confess. Because of the ingenious nature
of these techniques, the majority explicitly stated
that,
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so funda-
mental to our system of constitutional rule and
the expedient of giving an adequate warning
as to the availability of the privilege so simple,
we will not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the defendant was aware of his rights
without a warning being given.... Whatever
the background of the person interrogated a
warning is indispensable.
Furthermore, the Court held that in order to
validate any statement made while the accused was
in custody, an intelligent waiver of rights must
be shown. The Court explicitly stated that a
waiver or its equivalent could not be presumed
from a silent record.
But here the record shows neither warnings nor
waiver. Admittedly, this application of the stated
rule goes slightly beyond the interrogation in the
police station in Miranda. But an extension of the
rule to the facts in this case is certainly foreseeable
and desirable.
Exclusionary Rule And Search By Private
Citizens-People v. Botts, 58 Cal.Rptr. 412 (Cal.
App. 1967). Defendant was convicted of possession
of narcotics. A witness testified that by looking
through two holes in the wall he observed the de-
fendant in a service station restroom with a hypo-
dermic syringe and packet of white paper. The
witness reported his observations to the police and
the defendant was arrested. The defendant con-
tended that the observation by the witness
amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure.
The court admitted that such an observation
would be excluded if done by the police, but refused
to apply the exclusionary rule, holding that the
evidence was obtained by a private citizen acting
on his own, and not as a police agent. The court
reasoned that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to compel respect for the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it, and that the rule
would serve no function in situations where its
application would not deter improper searches in
the future. Private parties are unaware of the
exclusionary rule, and to apply it to cases such as
the present one would be to free a guilty man
without any assurance that there would be
counterbalancing restraint of similar conduct in the
future.
The court rejected the argument that the use of
privately obtained evidence at the criminal trial is
governmental action and that the application of
the exclusionary rule would operate to deter such
governmental action. In this case the citizens'
right of privacy had been violated prior to any
state action and was not dependent on any later
use made of the evidence seized.
Insolvency Does Not Excuse Bail Require-
ment-Walls v. Genung, 198 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1967).
Indicted for grand larceny, resisting arrest, and
rioting, the defendant filed a pre-trial petition
alleging that because of his adjudicated insolvency
a requirement of bail would be unreasonable. The
defendant appealed from an order reducing the
bond to $850. He contended that any bail would be
a denial of due process and equal protection of the
law.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that "the
petitioner... is not entitled to be discharged from
custody without bail". The court regarded as
paramount "the state's right to custody or control
of an accused" and refused "to make of indigency
a pass-key to all places of restraint." Furthermore,
the supreme court said that
in this age of incredible speed and mobility of
urban populations no presumption can be
indulged against the necessity for bail security
to achieve orderly administration of criminal
procedures and insure the presence of the
defendant to answer the charges that society
has lodged against him when his case is called
for trial.
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